

# **The Igbo Question and Political Configuration in Nigeria: Establishing the marginalization nexus**

**Joseph O. NKWEDE<sup>1</sup>, Godwin I. UDEUHELE<sup>1</sup>, Nurul AZIZAH<sup>2</sup>,  
Destiny U. NWODOM<sup>3</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science, Ebonyi State University,  
Abakaliki, Nigeria

<sup>2</sup>Department of Postgraduate Program, Universitas Ibrahimy, Situbondo,  
Indonesia

<sup>3</sup>Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria

## **Abstract**

This study examined what has seemingly become a deliberate strategy of denial against Igbo people in the Nigerian state. The marginalization debate has attracted serious tension in Nigeria to the extent that it has dominated national and international discourse in the political and scholarly domain. Both content analysis and descriptive statistical techniques were utilized for the analysis, while data presentation and interpretation were done using simple percentages and tables. The study identified salient issues for a better understanding of how the Igbo in Nigeria's political space are relegated to the background deliberately. To address these challenges, this study outlined policy alternatives concerning how the Igbo could be accommodated and reintegrated into the mainstream of Nigeria's politics, where the safety, happiness and joy of the Igbo would be complete while living with other ethnic nationalities. It then suggested a different approach that would guarantee equality in the allocation of power and resources among the geopolitical zones. These would eliminate the existing marginalization of the Igbo race in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Marginalization, Politics, Igbo, Ethnic Survival, Nigeria

## **Introduction**

No nation is an immaculate conception. Nearly every national history is an undulating pageant of glorious moments and inevitable episodes of brutish savagery and intense sadness. Nations come into being and progress, sometimes by wilfully or inadvertently hurting sections of their populace. Communal clashes, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, slavery, genocide, pogroms, insecurity, foolish mass killings, and reprisals thereof are part of national history. When the hour of sadness passes, the nation so afflicted incurs moral debts to those sections of the community that have been hurt (Amuta, 2020:13).

Amuta's (2020) assertion indeed triggered off, *inter alia*, the inevitability and essentiality of delving into the discourse of Igbo people in Nigeria. However, after the Nigerian Civil War, the estrangement of the Igbo from the mainstream of national political life is a national embarrassment. The marginalization is not just about infrastructural neglect. To be a member of a nation cannot be reduced to the visible construction of highways, bridges, and railway lines, and the political appointment of persons of Igbo extraction into federal offices to fulfil the constitutional requirements of federal character principles that can even be assumed by the most plastic explanation of citizenship. There are enormous signs of discrimination of the Igbo from the centre stage of the Nigerian project, proving that Nigeria has neither set aside the war, nor forgiven the Igbo for the Biafran war. The Igbo landscape still bears the tragic marks of the war and its anguish.

As a corollary of the above and on the side of the Igbo, a dangerous emotional disaffection has taken centre stage. Not only do the Igbo youth, who were promised that tomorrow belongs to them now, have the feeling that there must be some sin committed by their elders, which has prevented them from fully reaping the fruits of their being Nigerians; it seems that their political and economic aspirations cannot be met within Nigeria's current arrangement.

Idealistically, it is on the basis of this systemic exclusion of the Igbo from the leadership equation in the Nigerian political firmament – which has almost become the directive principle of an unscripted political code of conduct – that this study attempts to unravel the circumstances

surrounding the conundrum, by establishing the presence of marginalization of the Igbo in present-day Nigeria.

The cardinal objective of this study, therefore, is to systematically chronicle the extant incidences of marginalization against the Igbo in Nigeria. To address this problem, the study asks such pertinent questions as:

- Are there manifestations of marginalization of the Igbo in the Nigerian state?
- Why are the Igbo marginalized in the Nigerian state?
- What is the future of the Igbo race in Nigeria's political configuration?
- What are the practical mechanisms to end Igbo marginalization in the Nigerian state?

### **The Igbo People: A Recall of History**

It is a Herculean task to reconstruct the history of a preliterate and acephalous Igbo people. Scholars who in the past ventured to do so fell victim to either wild romanticism or sterile scepticism. The dangers have been pigeonholed to the study of the history of the Igbo-speaking people of South-eastern Nigeria and over the years, those who made excursions into this enterprise were ensnared by one or the other mistake.

Thus, because of the difficulty surrounding the tracing of the emergence of Igbo society, scholars have so far been contented to attempt to describe what the society was like before the adumbration of colonial rule and to analyse the changes which it has undergone since that epochal event (Afigbo, 1980). Faced with the difficulty of conventional records in dealing with the early history of the Igbo, any effort to reconstruct how Igbo people came into being as coherent socio-cultural and political units will have to concern itself with the critical analysis of what social-anthropologists have, probably aptly, described as the "ideological charters" validating existing unities and relationships (Floyd, 1969). Meanwhile, these charters are what ordinarily constitute the traditions of the origin of the various autonomous or sub-cultural units.

A better interpretation of such traditions was made by Floyd in 1969 when he posited that Igbo society emerged through the process of one village begetting another.

Afigbo (1975:28) ruminating on the origin of the Igbo people opined:

The Igbo, like any other group of people, are anxious to discover their origin and recollect on how they came to be where they are ... their experiences under colonialism and since Nigeria's independence have emphasized for them the reality of their group identity which they want to anchor into authenticated history.

Thus, the traditional history of the origin of a given people forms part of their thought, practice, and social life (Onwuejiogwu, 1981; Iwuadighi, 1997). Over the decades, "real work has been carried out on the issue of the origin of the Igbo as against foreign researchers' accusations that Igbo scholars have a basic lack of interest in grand history" (Iwuadighi, 1997:1). However, Thurstan (1975) posits that archaeology, linguistics (glottochronology), and ethno-history have all given useful but non-reliable proof. For this reason, "the origin question has as such not been fully established" (Iwuadighi, 1997:1); but Ilogu (1974:1) maintains that where the Igbo came from and when, will remain speculation due to the absence of records of archaeological findings that will establish the date of settlement of place of origin. Essentially and convincingly, there are conjectures or hypotheses on the origin of the Igbo, and these emerged from three schools of thought.

The first school offers the autochthony theory as a foundation of origin. Proponents of this theory are scholars like Hartle (1967), Isichei (1977), Afigbo (1981), and Okonkwo (1996). The major assumption of this theory is that "the Igbos has[sic] been here-where they have located now-since the beginning of time" (Iwuadighi, 1997:2). Their argument is based on their present area, without being immigrants and that they occupy an established territorial position. Hartle (1967) provided archaeological evidence that proves that the Igbo were in occupation of south-eastern Nigeria between 2000-3000 BC.

Agreeing with Hartle, Afigbo (1981:20) maintains that the archaeological findings of the Igbo with logistical evidence most likely can be traced back five or six thousand years. Isichei (1977) avers that the Igbo came from nowhere and challenged anybody that has evidence of where the Igbo came from to prove it. Scholars and adherents of this

hypothesis maintain that: "the Igbo according to historical records and paramedical traditions never lived anywhere outside the present Igbo homeland" (Iwuadighi, 1997:2).

The second ideological school proposes an internal migration hypothesis. The believers of this school regard "the Niger-Benue confluence as the original homeland of the Igbo and probably from there that the original Igbo hunters and gatherers migrated from Southwards to the Nsukka-Okigwe cuesta" (Iwuadighi, 1997:2). These scholars "established a fact that based on scientific evidence that Igbo people are traditional, as a migrant, located in an area East of the Niger River or South-Eastern Nigeria" (Iwuadighi, 1997:3). Furthermore, "Nri myth of origin and legends confirms[sic] that development of agriculture and iron technology emanated from the Nri-Awka, Anambra axis (Iwuadighi, 1997:2-3). Also, Iwuadighi notes that:

The NRI myth of origin holds that the earth originated from Aro and from there dispersed. According to this Nri myth of origin, the father of all Nri is Eri. No one knows where he came from. All traditions acknowledge that Eri came from God. It was God who sent Eri to the earth, as his arrival on the earth was not firm. This made him contact the Awka smiths who used their bellows to dry the soft land. When Eri came, there was no food for the people.

He prayed to God to send food. God demanded that Eri should sacrifice his first son and daughter to Him and so on. In the end, Eri controlled yam, other foods, and the earth (Okonkwo, 1996). What is certain about this origin is that it suggests the Igbo as having migrated from the northern side, always coming from the North, from outside of Nigeria and this emigration might have taken place almost the same times[sic] as that of the Greeks and Middle Eastern peoples. (Iwuadighi, 1997:3-4)

The Third School of thought postulates the External Migration Theory. The major assumption of this school is that the Igbo originated from the Jews and drifted from the Far East. The author further asserts thus:

This theory stipulates that the Igbos originated from the Middle East and that they wandered out of present-day Palestine during the Assyrian Assault in which the ten northern tribes of Israel fell about 718BC. The characteristic of this Assault according to biblical history and theology is that the Assyrians conquered northern Israel, and transported the people out, and planted another people in their land. Many of the tribes in northern Israel of this time wandered away in a different direction and got intermingled among different tribes and cultures and disappeared so to say from history. There is no significant explanation in biblical exegesis and history of the whereabouts of these tribes of northern Israel that were displaced (Ozigbo, 1988:20; Talbot, 1926:19). To that extent, this theory of the origin of Igbo holds that a tribe in northern Israel at that time of the Assyrian Assault called "Scheckenigbo" was among the tribes that wandered out of northern Israel. They supposedly wandered down to Egypt but remembered what happened to them in Egypt and left Egypt again and wandered further south. (Iwuadighi, 1997:6)

Meanwhile, Okorie (1983:8-11), professes that due to the fear that the Assyrians could pursue them, they removed the "Schecken" in their name and remained "Igbo" and continued to wander to Southwest Africa. Furthermore, the intermarriage between them and the people they met, according to the author has led them to where they are today as Nigerians.

However, at Niger River, some of them crossed over and settled while some of them stayed in the west of the Niger River, hereby known today as the Delta Igbo.

At this point, one is tempted to agree with Thurstan (1973) who believes that man evolved from the Negro, but how the Negro eventually got to South-Eastern Nigeria remains a mystery, due to the absence of evidence from any document to substantiate this claim. Anyhow, there is a distinctive characteristic of the Igbo "language".

Far from the above three schools of thought, the Igbo people are settled in the South eastern part of Nigeria with many appealing traditions and with a population of about 40 million people; they are also one of the most influential tribes. The Igbo are known for their entrepreneurial spirit and are hard working within and outside Nigeria.

From another perspective, the Igbo people are descendants of Eri, and were sent from heaven to begin civilization as stated by Igbo folklore. One account affirms Eri as one of the sons of God according to Genesis in the Bible, who travelled down to establish the present-day-Igbo land". In addition, it stresses that:

In contemporary Nigeria, the Igbo inhabit an area referred to as Igbo land, which is divided into two sections along the lower River Niger. They live in most or all parts of five states vis-à-vis Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo, as well as minor parts of Delta, Rivers, Kogi and Benue States. Some Igbo communities are also found in parts of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. As a corollary of the transatlantic slave trade, Igbos have migrated to other countries including Jamaica, Cuba, Barbados, Belize, the United States, Australia, Switzerland, America, and other countries of the world.

However, Igbo political life differs significantly from most of its West African neighbours, with the exception of a few communities that have an Obi (king). The Igbo practice a republican system of government, which allows consultative assembly and guarantees the equality of citizens. The practice is a departure from the usual form of government with a king ruling over the subjects, although there are titleholders who are respected for their achievements, never revered as kings.

### **Unearthing Igbo Status Before and After the Nigerian Independence**

The Igbo have been in existence before the forcible incursion of Britain. The Igbo made indispensable economic contributions to the British economy. However, some scholars hold the view that it appears that it was in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century that the existence of the Igbo and their incredible great relevance dawned on the world. According to Olutayo (1999), the knowledge of their existence began in 1832 when River Niger provided a navigation route for trade to Britain from North Africa and

Northern Nigeria. At the coast, the middlemen (the coastal chiefs) who were the Ijaws restricted the trading activities of the European merchants to the seaboard. Olutayo (1999:153) argues that “during the second wave of migration to the coast around 1450-1800, the numerically superior Igbo were predominant”. They grew exponentially in economic importance and political superiority such that they could hinder further migration of the European merchants to the coast, but for slave trading.

Nevertheless, the movement of the Igbo to the coast has been arguably attributed to the slave trade and hunger for land. In the words of Dike (1956:28):

Igbo pressing against limited land resources needed to seek other avenues of livelihood outside their tribal boundaries. In the 19th century and earlier, the growth of a non-agricultural population where the land was too small and too poor to sustain the people, gave rise to some measure of specialization among the sections of the tribe: the Aros became the middlemen of the hinterland; the Ada and the Abam constituted the mercenaries; Awka men were the smiths and doctors; while Nkwere people, in addition to their work in iron, played the role of professional spies and diplomats. If we may judge from the 19<sup>th</sup> Century records, despite this specialization, overpopulation was the rule in all sections of the tribe. This reservoir of manpower may account for the fact that Igbo land supplied the greater part of the slaves shipped to the New World from the Bights of Benin and Biafra.

Beyond slave trading, the European economy was palm oil-driven, resulting in the abolition of the slave trade and in particular Britain's entry into the hinterland via the elimination of the middlemen. Britain's direct access to the oil markets would provide a reliable profit to her economy. Worthy of note is that the Igbo owned the oil markets but were denied control of the sale of their products (Olutayo, 1999).

Importantly, the establishment of direct trade with the Europeans, traceable to the beginning of the 1870s, proved the entrepreneurial skills of the Igbo. Before the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, the Igbo had



regarded trade as both a pleasure and necessity, turning their markets into the main features of their lives and trading (Olutayo, 1999).

Aside from the European economic expansion to Igboland, another way of destroying and substituting the identity of the people, Olutayo (1999) observed, was the establishment of Christianity in the Niger with the setting up of the Presbyterian Church in Calabar in 1846, Church Missionary Society (CMS) in 1856, and others. The influence of the Christian religion in the sociology of Igbo today played a significant role in weakening the people's tradition.

There was no country known as Nigeria to the world until 1914. The people of Nigeria then were known as Yoruba, Igbo, Tiv, Benin, indicating the multi-ethnic character of Nigeria (Idike et al., 2019). The establishment of British rule and the introduction of warrant chiefs in Nigeria negatively altered the traditional Igbo socio-cultural configuration. The warrant chiefs were tools for colonial dictatorship and exploitation (Adegbulu, 2011). The incompatibility of the Igbo decentralized governance model and the centralized governance style mandated for British indirect rule created tension among the Igbo people. Adegbulu (2011) further posits that the conflict that ensued between the colonial government representatives and the hitherto town unions destabilized the peace and unity among the pre-colonial Igbo people. Politically, Britain in 1960 granted independence to Nigeria, but before then, some nationalists fought for self-governance according to historians ("Nigeria at 58", 2021).

Accordingly, Nnamdi Azikiwe (of Igbo extraction) made the "list of five important Nigerians who helped fight for Nigeria's independence" alongside Herbert Macaulay, Obafemi Awolowo, Sir Almadu Bello, and Anthony Enahoro. It is worthy of note that:

Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe was born on the 16th of November, 1904 in Niger State and was at the forefront of the independence of Nigeria. He was generally, known as "Zik" and the first President of Nigeria after independence. As an editor of the African Morning Post, a daily newspaper in Ghana, Azikiwe promoted pro-African nationalist agenda. In 1937, he returned to Nigeria and founded the West African Pilot an instrument used to

promote the cause of Nigerian nationalism. In 1944, together with Herbert Macaulay, he founded the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and he became the Secretary-General in 1946. He was later elected to the Legislative Council of Nigeria and was the first Nigerian to become the Privy Council of the United Kingdom and Governor-General on the same day. With Nigeria becoming a republic in 1963, he became her first President (Nigeria at 58, 2021:1).

It must be pointed out here that in those heydays of colonial rule, Azikiwe (popularly called Zik) played a very significant role in Nigerian politics. Scholars agree that the return of Azikiwe to Nigeria in 1937 marked a turning point in Nigerian political history. This is particularly so because he used his journalistic power to give a penalty kick to the independence movement and was hell-bent on doing everything possible for the redemption of Nigeria, and Continental Africa in general. Zik, in 1945, made a remarkable statement thus:

I go away to the "bush" whence I came. If it is the will of Providence that I should go away from this world by the bullet of a European assassin, and then I go with the supreme confidence and spiritual satisfaction that I have served Mother-Africa to the limit of my physical ability and even gave my most prized possession – my life – for the Redemption of Africa. (Anagbogu, 2004: 34)

It could be the above statement that made Olusanya (1973) argue that in the post-War (World War II) era, Zik contributed to the development of the political awakening of Nigerians more than any other person and it would not be wide off the mark to state that without Zik, the story of the independence movement in Nigeria would have been a different one.

In particular, Zik left an indelible imprint on Nigerian politics as his oratorical power was applied to politics. Olusanya (1973:37) rightly observed that "Azikiwe himself became the idol of the masses, particularly in southern Nigeria, and whatever he said and wrote was taken as gospel truth...whatever Azikiwe did must be right".

With the death of Herbert Macaulay in 1946, Zik took over the leadership of the NCNC as the President. What is essential here is that Azikiwe succeeded in transforming the party into a veritable instrument for nationalist agitation and nation-building as the membership of the party was drawn from virtually all trade unions, ethnic unions, and student associations. Importantly, by 1960, the NCNC had become the most popular party despite the existence of the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), which had its root in Northern Nigeria. Anagbogu (2004) argued that the popularity of NCNC, the Zik-led party, could be seen from the result of the general elections conducted in 1959 into the Federal House of Representatives. In that election, NCNC polled the highest vote cast (2,594,577) thereby establishing itself as the most popular party in Nigeria. The Action Group (AG) led by Obafemi Awolowo became the second most popular party by polling 1,992,364 votes; and the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) led by Ahmadu Bello came third by securing 1,992,179 votes (Anagbogu, 2004:4).

Zik as the Premier of Eastern Nigeria used his political power to enhance the education and economic wellbeing of the Igbo and established the University of Nigeria, Nsukka with its motto as "to restore the dignity of man" and made sure that classes commenced in the university on 17th October 1960.

Azikiwe must be remembered for his political activism and for catapulting the Igbo into the main orbit of Nigerian politics. Again, he encouraged a lot of Igbo people to pursue higher education abroad. Mention must be made of Jaja Nwachukwu, who later became the speaker of the Federal House of Representatives; Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe, a former Federal Minister; Mbonu Ojike, a former Eastern Nigeria Minister; Dr. A. A. Nwafor Orizu, former President of the Senate, among others.

The success of the Igbo-led NCNC party could have produced a head of government after the 1959 Federal elections by allying with the Action Group Party, but Azikiwe and some top Igbo politicians preferred to go into alliance with the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC). The position of Prime Minister (Head of Federal Government) went to the NPC (Abubakar Tafawa Belewa), while the post of Governor-General, and later, President of the Republic went to the NCNC party lead by Azikiwe.

Dr Azikiwe's critics have argued that his policies left the Igbo naked, as events revealed; however, in a swift reaction to his critics, Azikiwe stated thus:

Given certain observers, here and abroad, my decision to accept and assume the office of Governor-General had been surprising. They thought that since I was the leader of a political party that contested the last federal elections, I should continue to fight to displace the present head of our government, instead of supporting the conclusion of a political truce and agreeing to become what one of them euphemistically described a prisoner in a gilded cage. (Anagbogu, 2004:6)

Azikiwe indeed was purely nationalistic in his political engagements, which was widely noticed in his Presidential Address to the first conference of the Igbo Union held in Aba in 1949, where he served as the President-General and had this to say, according to the *West African Pilot*, 1949 as cited in Anagbogu, (2004:555) "It seems that the God of Africa had especially created the Igbo to deliver Africa from the bondage of the ages ... the Igbo nation cannot shirk its responsibilities from its manifest destiny".

It is a truism that from the above statement, Azikiwe and his Igbo-dominated NCNC party led the people of Africa's most populous country (Nigeria) into independence in 1960.

The independence of 1960 came on the heels of persistent agitation of nationalists with a seemingly collective commitment to "nation-building" among the major ethnic nationalities.

Nevertheless, the looming threat to, and the unsustainable corporate existence of Nigeria became clearer with the event of the military takeover of governance in the country. The unverifiable claims that the January 15th, 1966 coup was masterminded by a crop of Igbo soldiers renewed the anti-Igbo sentiments in northern Nigeria. General Gowon's transition to power following the counter-coup of July 29, 1966, in which General Aguiyi Ironsi was killed, marked the epicentre of this threatened unity. This and other forms of injustice including the pogrom of the Igbo population in the North triggered a feeling of insecurity among the Igbo in Nigeria.

Consequently, Col. Ojukwu declared the “Republic of Biafra” on 30th May 1967. One explanation for such an action was the creation of 12 states from the Federation on 27th May 1967 by General Gowon. This was considered highly provocative, leading to the secessionist move by Col. Ojukwu. General Gowon promulgated a state creation decree and carved out Rivers State, predominantly the Ijaw and related ethnic groups like Efik, Ibibio, Anang, and the peoples of Ogoja; and an East-Central State, an exclusively Igbo state from the Eastern Region to deprive the Igbo of all direct access to the sea (Dudly, 1968).

Eventually, war ensued in 1967 and ended in 1970. Ojukwu was defeated with the assistance of foreign powers and the claimed Biafran territory has remained part of Nigeria. Since the end of the Civil War, the Igbo have been oppressed, marginalized, and killed under various guises.

The reasons for the Civil War were complex but can be better appreciated in the studies of scholars like Diamond, 1967; Sklar, 1967; Forsythe, 1969; Kirk-Greene, 1971; De St. Jorre, 1972; Nwankwo, 1972; Madiebo, 1980; Jacobs, 1987; and Stremlau, 2015. Indeed, the 30 months of the civil war affected both the first and second generations of the Igbo. The first generation of Igbo affected by the war were those who witnessed the civil war, while the second set of Igbo people were those born after the war. The first generation was characterized by a severe scarcity of social amenities including the denial of government appointments immediately after the war, even though recovery interventions were made occasioned by the oil boom in the 1970s which expanded government resources (Richard, Sonia, Marinella & Una, 2017). The Nigerian government, with the aid of international agencies, made an effort to reunite the Igbo population affected by the war and restored social and public utility services (Ukpong, 1975). It was evidenced in the Second Republic that the highest position allotted to the Igbo in the federal executive council was that of vice president, which was occupied by Alex Ekwueme of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN).

As stated earlier, the second generation of Igbo people affected by the civil war are those born in the 70s and beyond. It is this second generation of Igbo that are the worst hit by the effects of war as they lack everything that makes life amenable, in spite of the supposed *One Nigeria*.

The civil war caused humanitarian challenges in the Southeast, predominantly occupied by the Igbo, who were purposely displaced from government, particularly the posts occupied by them before the civil war and replaced with the Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani. Meanwhile, those civil servants of Igbo extraction who left to join similar posts in Biafra were replaced and regarded as having resigned, instead of sacked. The feeling of injustice emerged due to this replacement and *the twenty pounds policy* whereby the Igbo were offered twenty pounds in exchange for their Biafran currency after the war ended. This policy was a deliberate action to suppress the Igbo and deny them of the wealth they acquired before the war, as a sign of people defeated in war. Notwithstanding that the war was fought a half-century ago, the Igbo are still treated with suspicion, distrust, denial of social amenities from the Federal Government, structural inequality, crises, and mostly the disregard of the federal character principle. The negative effect of the war seems to have been transferred to the next generation.

If this assumption is false, then the new intergenerational transmission of exposure to wars has negative consequences. Unarguably, the Igbo have been expelled from the centre stage of power, which has led to instability, but of present and primary concern is the quest to avoid a repetition of ethnic tension.

### **Theoretical Paradigm**

This study is anchored on the Relative Deprivation Theory, developed by Robert K. Merton as a concept for explaining deviant behaviour. Merton used the concept of anomie by a French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, as a point of departure. The theory was further expanded by scholars like Karl Polanyi, Walter Runciman, Ted Robert Gurr, Jerry D. Rose, in the explanation of other social behaviours. Essentially, the proponents of this theory argue that relative deprivation is the possible reason for agitations, social actions, and distrust, which most times lead to violent situations like mass protests, terrorism, war, destruction, and other cases of social disturbances such as crime (Merton, 1938; Gurr, 1970; Rose, 1982).

The major assumption of this theory is that people feel aggrieved when they are deprived of what they perceive as valuable, entitled to, and capable of getting; this is the cause of deviant behaviour in society

(Itumo, Nwobashi & Offor, 2018). Runciman (1966), in an attempt to demonstrate how deprivation can lead to deviant behaviour averred that there are basic assumptions and/or preconditions of relative deprivation of (object X by person A): Person A does not have X, person A knows of other persons that have X, person A wants to have X, person A believes obtaining X is realistic. Consequently, apologists of this assumption assert that the deprivation of valuables and rights, which they believe they have the capacity of achieving, is the main reason for abnormal behaviours in society.

In this regard, the theory maintains that when people or individuals are denied or deprived of the entitlements they are expected to get, they become aggrieved when they compare their strength and chances of getting such entitlements from other people who simply accomplish such entitlements.

The relevance of this theory to the current study is that it does not only explain the feelings of the Igbo concerning their marginalization in Nigeria, but further demonstrates the *raison d'être* for agitations for the inclusion of the Igbo in the Nigerian political firmament.

### **Methodology**

The study employed the qualitative method in carrying out its investigation. The study generated data from secondary sources. To that extent, this research relied on evidence presented in journals, periodicals, books, documentary materials as well as relevant internet materials, all carefully retrieved. Both content analysis and descriptive statistical techniques were utilized for the analysis, while data presentation and interpretation were with the use of simple percentages and tables.

### **Discussion and Analysis**

#### ***Igbo in the Contemporary Political Configuration of Nigeria***

Unarguably, it is glaring that the Igbo experience an overwhelming level of disadvantages based on public policies that seemed crafted to undermine their ability to maximize political and economic potentials.

Examining Igbo experiences, the context of the economic and political sphere before 1967 and the current circumstances in Nigeria suggest that the Igbo people are an appendage of the Nigerian federation, arising from the unprecedented flagrant exclusion of the Igbo race from the political and socio-economic spheres.

The word “marginalization” in this context, is a phenomenon that is coordinated by an enormity of factors associated with the social and economic conditions of the Igbo in Nigeria. Marginalization is an issue that essentially has continued to glaringly and dramatically manifest in different scopes in the socio-economic and political lives of the Igbo. To a large extent, though sometimes hidden, it is most often open, but dominant in the socio-economic and political space in Nigeria.

Scholars like Duruji (2009), Iheriohanma (2012), Okaneme (2014), Nwobashi (2014), Nsoedo (2019), and Nkwede and Nwodom (2020) are all in agreement that marginalization began after the civil war in 1976. This is because it grew full-scale and became more pronounced immediately after the civil war in 1970. The effects of the war have earlier been stated. Primarily, the deliberate and outrageous masterminding of policies purposely to cripple the Igbo race has become disturbing to Ndigbo (Igbo descendants). Notwithstanding, the survival of the Igbo against this despicable economic gang-up is due to their sheer bravery, determination, dexterousness, and the ingenuity and struggle to survive despite man-made odds placed in their paths.

Before highlighting the level of marginalization of the Igbo people in the present dispensation, it may be wise to chronicle what has played out in the various administrations from 1970 to 2020 to enable a clear bearing on this discourse. At the terminus of the Nigerian-Biafran civil war, the Igbo were insignificantly appointed into the federal executive council, even when some prominent Igbo sons and daughters identified themselves with the Nigerian Government during the war and were eminently qualified for those appointments. During the Murtala/Obasanjo regime, only 10% of those appointed to the federal cabinet were of Igbo extraction (Nkwede and Nwodom, 2020). During the Shagari administration in the Second Republic, only 20% of the Cabinet members were Igbo, while in Buhari’s military regime only 15% of the Supreme Military Council members were Igbo. The ugly trend continued during Babangida’s regime as only 13.3% were Igbo people. Shonekan’s



Interim National Government had 20% of its cabinet members as Igbo. The Abacha/Abubakar regime maintained 19.5% Igbo membership. In Obasanjo's administration, the number of Igbo in his cabinet rose to 29.6%, while Yar'Adua and Jonathan's administration had Igbo as 47.5% of its cabinet members, respectively. In the current Buhari cabinet less than 5% of members are Igbo. All this is further demonstrated in Table 1.

**Table 1: Percentage of Appointments of the Igbo into Federal Positions, 1970-2020**

S/N	Regime in Power	Years	Percentage (%) of Igbo Appointed
1	Yakubu Gowon	1967-1975	3%
2	Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo	1975-1979	10%
3	Shehu Shagari	1979-1983	20%
4	Muhammadu Buhari	1983-1985	15%
5	Badamosi Babangida	1985-1993	13.30%
6	Ernest Shonekan	1993-1993	20%
7	Sani Abacha/Abdulsalami Abubakar	1993-1999	19.50%
8	Olusegun Obasanjo	1999-2007	29.60%
9	Musa Yar'Adua/Goodluck E. Jonathan	2007/2015	47.50%
10	Muhammadu Buhari	2015-2020	Total denial 0.5%

*Source:* The Authors

Emphatically, it should be noted that on federal appointments, the Igbo have been relegated to the background. Nsoedo (2019) identifies the following specific policy areas and schemes of the Nigerian Government against people of Igbo extraction:

- Lack of rehabilitation after the civil war
- Twenty pounds flat refund fee
- Indigenization decree
- Manipulated population census
- Creation of states and local governments areas

These are briefly analysed hereunder for better understanding:

(a) **Lack of Rehabilitation after the Civil War:** The policy of Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (3Rs) introduced by the General Gowon regime was merely cosmetic, since it was never actually carried out, however, the “abandoned property policy” was vigorously followed (Obi-Ani, 2009; Gowon, 2014; Udeajah, 2017). Thus, the outcome was not only economical, but a deliberate plan to divide the Igbo and other ethnic groups in the Federation.

(b) **Twenty Pounds Flat Fee Refund:** The Nigerian Government deliberately imposed the 20 Pounds Flat Rate Refund Policy without circumspection (Aduba, 2017). That policy was aimed at hindering the progress of the Igbo nation. For Saro-Wiwa (2012), the policy was aimed at keeping the Igbo from recovering from the economic damages of the civil war.

(c) **Indigenization Decree:** The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972, also known as the Indigenization Decree, was truly intended for indigenization, but not done in the interest of the Igbo. The Decree was enacted at a perilous and precarious time, when the Igbo were at their weakest economically. All other ethnic groups were able to participate in purchasing shares of those blue-chip companies except for the Igbo (Obi-Ani, 2009; Nsoedo, 2019).

(d) **Manipulated Population Census:** The 1973 population census was incredibly manipulated to the advantage of certain ethnic groups over the Igbo. The bloated population advantage was consequently applied in the subsequent states and local government creation, and in the sharing of revenues, and this has been the practice until date (Metz, 1991).

(e) **Federal Character Principle:** Ultimately, the plan of the Federal Character Principle has not been applied the way it should, and has not been followed according to the dictates of the Constitution, particularly when it comes to placing an Igbo man in a certain position. The Federal Character Commission as it affects the Igbo is now a Commission without character.

Essentially, in the current Buhari administration, the Igbo are the worst hit because of its insensitivity when making appointments and decisions. Remarkably, it should be noted that this regime has

purposefully excluded the Igbo from National Defence, and the National Security Council (Busari, 2018). This portends danger to the Igbo nation, to the extent that their security as members of the Nigerian nation is not guaranteed.

Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the level of marginalization in state/local government creation and list of appointments made from 2015 to 2020.

**Table 2: Level of Marginalization in State and Local Government Creation in the South-East Geo-Political Zone**

S/N	Zone	State	Local Government Areas
1	South-east	5	95
2	South-south	6	115
3	South-west	6	137
4	North-east	6	113
5	North-central	6+FCT	118
6	North-West	7	186
Total	6	36	774

*Source:* Nkwede (2017:70-80).

While this problem did not start with the regime currently in power, an objective analysis of the present administration will reveal a sinister plot for gradual alienation and elimination of the Igbo people from the Nigerian Federation. Never in the history of this country has the Federal Government been this insensitive to the plight of the Igbo. Table 3 below is an eloquent testimony of the kind of appointments made by the current administration, which has turned the Igbo into fugitives, refugees, and victims of government insensitivity on their own soil.

**Table 3: List of Appointments into Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) in Nigeria from 2015 to 2020**

S/N	Name	Position	Region
	Muhammadu Buhari	President and Minister of Petroleum	North
	Ahmed Lawan	Senate President	North
	Tanko Mohamed	Chief Justice of the Federation	North
	Monica-Dongban Mensen	President of the Court of Appeal	North

S/N	Name	Position	Region
	Ahmed Idris Wase	Deputy Speaker, Federal House of Representatives	North
	Babagana Monguno	National Security Adviser	North
	Boss Mustapha	Secretary to the Government of the Federation	North
	Lt. General Yusuf Buratai	Chief of Army Staff	North
	Air Marshall Sadique Abubakar	Chief of Air Staff	North
	Mohamed Adamu	Inspector General of Police	North
	Hammed Ali	Comptroller General, Nigeria Customs Service	North
	Jaafaru Ahmed	Comptroller General, Nigerian Correctional Service	North
	Mohamed Babandede	Comptroller General, Nigeria Immigration Service	North
	Abdullahi Gana Mohammad	Commandant General, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps	North
	Yusuf Magaji Bichi	Chairman, State Security Service (DSS)	North
	AVM Mohamed Usman	Chief of Defence Intelligence	North
	Muhamed Mustapha Abduallah	Chairman/CEO, NDLEA	North
	Brigadier General Shuaibu Ibrahim	DG, National Youth Service Corps (NYSC)	North
	Ahmed Rufai Abubakar	DG, National Intelligence Agency	North
	Zainab Ahmed	Minister of Finance	North
	Isah Pantami	Minister of Communication and Digital Economy	North
	Sabo Nanono	Minister of Agriculture	North
	Sulaiman Adamu	Minister of Water Resources	North
	Mohamed Bello	FCT Minister	North
	Ramatu Tijani	FCT Minister of State	North
	Abubakar Malami	Attorney General and Minister of Justice	North
	Ahmed Idris	Accountant General of the Federation	North
	Mele Kiari	Group Managing Director, NNPC	North
	Garba Abbari	DG, National Orientation Agency	North

S/N	Name	Position	Region
	Mohamed Nami	Chairman, FIRS	North
	Bashir Jamoh	DG, NIMASA	North
	Hadiza Balla Usman	Chairman, Ports Authority	North
	Mansur Liman	DG, FRCN	North
	Yakubu Ibn Mohamed	DG, NTA	North
	Nasir Ladan Agungu	DG, NDA	North
	Prof. Abubakar Rashid	Executive Secretary, NUC	North
	Prof. Umar Dambata	Executive Secretary NCC	North
	Kashim Ibrahim Imam	Executive Secretary, TETFund	North
	AVM Muhammadu Alahaji Muhammed	DG, NEMA	North
	Lamido Yuguda	DG, Securities and Exchange Commission	North
	Prof. Muhamed Sambo	Executive Secretary, NHIS	North
	Prof. Armstrong Idachaba	DG, Nigerian Broadcasting Commission	North
	Prof. Aliyu Jauro	DG, NESREA	North
	Nurudeen Rafindadi	MD, FERMA	North
	Musa Nuhu	DG, NCAA	North
	Rabiu Yagudu	MD, FAAN	North
	Garba Abubakar	Registrar General, CAC	North
	Abdulkarim Obaje	National Coordinator, CSDP	North
	Aisha Dahiru-Umar	Acting DG, PENCOM	North
	Abdullahi Kachifu	DG, NITDA	North
	Abubarkar Abba Bello	MD, NEXIM Bank	North
	Aliyu Abduhamid	MD, NIRSAL	North
	Hassan Alwan	Acting MD, Bank of Agriculture	North
	Ahmed Dangiwa	MD, FMBN	North
	Adamu Adaji	DG, National Boundary Commission	North
	Ahmed Kadi Amshi	Chairman, National Assembly Service Commission	North
	Hamid Boboi	Executive Secretary, UBEC	North
	Abdulaziz Aliyu	DG, National Identity Management Commission	North

S/N	Name	Position	Region
	Maimuna Yaya Abubakar	Chairman, NIPOST	North
	Ahmed Kuru	MD, AMCON	North
	Yusuf Asir Dambatta	Acting Secretary, National Assembly Service Commission	North
	Gambo Aliyu	DG, NACA	North
	Maman Ahmadu	DG, BPP	North
	Bukahari Bello	Chairman, FRSC	North
	Muhammed Jubril	DG, National Board for Technology Incubation	North
	Prof. Abubakar Sharabutu	Executive Secretary, Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria	North
	Ibrahim Goni	Conservator General, National Parks Service	North
	Hassan Bello	Executive Secretary/CEO, Nigerian Shippers Council	North
	Prof. Isah Hayatu Ciroma	DG, Nigerian Law School	North
	Mohamed Umar	Acting Chairman, EFCC	North
	Faisal Shuaibu	ED/CEO, Nigerian Primary Health Care	North
	Umar Ibrahim	MD, NDIC	North
	Ahmad Salihijo Ahmad	MD/CEO, Rural Electrification Agency	North
	Sule Ahmed Abdulaziz	Acting MD, Transmission Company of Nigeria	North
	Mohamed Umar	Director, DPP	North
	Saidu Malama	Chairman, Solid Mineral Fund	North
	Abdukadir Saidu	Executive Secretary, PPPRA	North
	Dasuki Arabi	DG, Bureau of Public Service Refunds	North
	Prof. Adam Okene Ahmed	Acting Provost, Nigerian Defence Academy	North
	Prof. Baba Muhamad Aliyu	Executive Secretary, Federal Commission for Colleges of Education	North
	Prof. Ahmed Tijani Mora	Chairman, Pharmacy Council of Nigeria	North
	Air Commodore Yusuf Anas	Executive Secretary, Centre for Crisis Communication	North

S/N	Name	Position	Region
	Muheeda Farida Dankaka	Chairman, Federal Character Commission	North
	Fatima Shinkafi	Executive Secretary, Solid Mineral Fund	North
	Senator Basheer Mohamed	Chairman, National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs	North
	Prof. Muhamed Toafiq Ladan	DG, Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies	North
	Bala Yabani Mohamed	Acting Deputy Clerk of the National Assembly	North
	Dauda Ibrahim El-Ladan	Acting Clerk of the Senate	North
	John Tsoho	Chief Judge of the Federal High Court	North
	Major General Sarham Jamilu	Commandant, Nigerian Defence Academy	North
	Prof. Mahmood Yakubu	Chairman, INEC	North

*Source:* Compiled by the authors

From Tables 2 and 3, there is a clear indication of the flagrant marginalization of the Igbo people in Nigeria's present political configuration. Major critical sectors where the Igbo have been grossly marginalized include but are not limited to the following:

**i. Revenue Agencies:** NNPC, NPC, Customs, FIRS, CAC, TCN, NCAA, FAAN, NIMASA, National Parks, Solid Mineral Fund and Immigration;

**ii. Information Communication Technology:** NOA, NCC, FRCN, NITDA, NTA, MBC;

**iii. Security, Intelligence and Paramilitary:** COAS, CAS, IGP, DSS, NDLEA, NSCDC, NDA, NIA, NYSC, Correctional Service and Defence Intelligence, Customs, Immigration;

**iv. Education:** NUC, TETFUND, Law School, NDA, NIALS, NILDS, Agric Research Council and Technology Incubation;

**v. All the Federal Government Banks and other Financial Agencies:** NIRSAL, NDCC, NEXIM, AMCON, FMBN, and BOA;

**vi. Interventionist Agencies:** FERMA, SMEDAN, NDE, NEMA, PPPRA, NESREA, CSDP, EFCC and REA; and

**vii. Judiciary:** Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and the Federal High Court are being headed by Northern elements in connivance with numerous permanent secretaries and director positions in the Civil Service, and even the choice of ambassadorial postings excluded Ndigbo.

Furthermore, from Table 2 therefore, the marginalization of the Igbo is confirmed in state and local government creation in Nigeria. The situation is also obvious in the distribution of the federal wealth for developmental projects across the country. For instance, the 2018 fiscal budget shows that out of the total 286.76 billion earmarked for developmental projects in the various geo-political zones, the South-east got just 28.22 billion, representing only (0.98%) which is extremely small compared to what other regions got from the national budget (Nkwede, Dauda and Orija, 2018).

The above narrative therefore represents six instruments used for the marginalization of the Igbo in the present Nigerian political configuration, which are identified as political emasculation, state creation policy, discrimination in federal appointments, military neutralization, selective development, and the subsisting educational policy.

### *What Has Gone Wrong?*

If nations survive according to their capacity to both “accumulate and legitimate”, and if this capacity is dependent on and mediated by the historical relationships forged between and among interested individuals and groups, then, the 1967-1970 Biafran war was a turning point in the history of the Igbo. This is so, not because the war lacked legitimacy, but simply because it provoked the question of future historical compromises and accommodations on which the Nigerian Federation rested, and due to the “politics of respectability” practiced up to that point which had proven inadequate from preventing its imposition.

The current neglect of the Igbo may be a bargaining chip of the political elite of Igbo extraction, who are indeed frustrated by their current status in a federation where they held star positions in the past. Meanwhile, the Jonathan administration favoured the Igbo in terms of juicy political appointments and influence due to the perceived overture that they overwhelmingly voted for Jonathan. Furthermore, the current loud gang-up against perceived Igbo marginalization currently is a



product of the fear of and the expectation that the Igbo might want to pull down the gains already made politically by other ethnic nationalities in Nigeria, which would be detrimental to them.

Additionally, Igbo elitist politics of exclusion and personal interest has contributed to the current predicament faced by the Igbo people. This is because the political class is not united and also does not speak with one voice. The present agitation for an all-inclusive government on the side of the Igbo is antithetical to the quest for power-sharing and equal representation. With all the power and wealth acquired by the Igbo people through their legitimate ingenuity, it is difficult for an Igbo man to dream of the presidency unless there is unity at the homestead, and adequate commitment to the cause of the Igbo race. From 1999 till 2019, Igbo people, in spite of the hue and cry of marginalization in the polity, have had Evans Enwerem (Senate president), Chuba Okadigbo (Senate president), Pius Anyim (Senate president and Secretary to the Government of the Federation), Ken Nnamani (Senate president), Adolphus Wabara (Senate president), and Ike Ekweremadu (deputy senate president). They had these monumental and legitimate powers to influence things that that would come to the Igbo people, but, is there anything to show for it? Is it only when someone from Ndigbo becomes president that magic will happen? How was it done in the days of Zikism, when the Igbo race provided leadership in Nigeria and continental Africa, in general? It is all about the heart and not the position as exemplified by Nnamdi Azikiwe and Alex Ekwueme, both of blessed memory. The problem of Ndigbo is the heart of a typical Igbo man. When will we exalt the welfare of our fellow Igbo people above our personal interests? Once that is resolved, then the notion of an Igbo presidency will become meaningful.

### **Conclusion and Road to a Closer Union**

The politics of leadership supremacy in a multi-ethnic nation-state is competitive. The competition is made fiercer by the scramble for the allocation of scarce resources in a political economy that emphasizes entitlement over productivity. In the struggle for structural equality, the current tasks for the Igbo political elite are numerous in the quest for prominence. The Igbo political elite has to be courageous in order to compete with the political elites from the other geo-political zones in the country.

They need to assure the rest of the Ndigbo that entrusting them with an exalted position and power will enhance the prospects of the Igbo man for better governance and more productive leadership. Of course, identity politics in a multinational state requires deft footwork. The most imperative ingredient for the Igbo to embark on is first, a willingness to negotiate with competing elites and factions. As instinctive business-oriented people, deal-making ought to be a major asset of the Igbo. However, the typical Igbo individual has disturbing disposition to pride, arrogance, and noisy ebullience, capable of hindering him from mingling freely with other tribes.

In the best interests of the Igbo as a people, their leaders should be more proactive in dismantling the albatross of marginalization. It is glaring that the Igbo hardly get on their knees to seek a favour. This is so because negotiating for a balance of power requires a mixture of self-assurance and pragmatic flexibility. When you go out to seek the lion's share of what belongs to all (Igbo people), you go in meekness clothed in diplomacy and ideological insights.

## References

- Adegbulu, F. (2011). From warrant chiefs to ezeship: A distortion of traditional institutions in Igboland? *Afro Asian Journal of Social Science*, 2 (2).
- Aduba, B.O. (2017). Opinion: The Nigerian twenty pounds policy of the seventies implementation. *The Will*. <https://thewillnigeria.com/news/opinion-the-nigerian-twenty-pounds-policy-of-the-seventies-implementation/>.
- Afigbo, A.E. (1975). Prolegomena to the study of the cultural history of the Igbo-speaking people of Nigeria, Igbo language and culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Afigbo, A.E. (1980). Igboland before 1800. In: Obaro Ikime (ed.) *Groundwork of Nigerian History*. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.
- Afigbo, A.E. (1981). Ropes and Sans. *Studies in Igbo History and Culture*. Ibadan: OUP.
- Amuta, C. (2020). 2023: Igbos and the politics of moral consequence. *Thisday*, 23rd August. An introduction to Nigeria's Igbo people

- (n.d). Culture Trip. <http://theculturetrip.com/Africa/articles/an-introduction-to-nigerias-igbo-people/>
- Anagbogu, I. (2004). Igbo power in Nigeria. Awka: Sellyoak International Company.
- Busari, K. (2018). Buhari deliberately sidelined south east in security appointment. *Premium Times*, 13<sup>th</sup> June.
- De St. Jorre, J. (1972). *The Nigerian civil war*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Diamond, S. (1967). The Biafran secession. *Africa Today*, 14(3):1-2.
- Dike, K.O. (1956). *British enterprises in Nigeria*. New York, Toronto: Barnes and Nobles.
- Dudly, B.J. (1968). Nigeria's civil war: The round table. *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*. Doi: 101080/0035836808452718.
- Duruji, M. M. (2009). Social inequality, democratic transition and the Igbo nationalism resurgence in Nigeria. *Africa Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 3(1):054-065.
- Floyd, B. (1969). Eastern Nigeria: A geopolitical review. London: Macmillan.
- Forsythe, D. P. (1969). United Nations intervention in conflict situations revisited: A framework for analysis. *International Organization*, 23(1):115-139.
- Gowon, Y. (2014). Civil war: Why we declared 'No Victor, No Vanquished'. Blue Print.
- Gurr, T. R. (1970). *Why men rebel*. Princeton University Press.
- Hartle, D. D. (1967). Archaeology in eastern Nigeria. In: *Nigeria Magazine*, 93, June.
- Idike, A., Ukeje, I.O., Iwuala, H.O., Onele, J.C., Ekwunife, R.A., Nwachukwu, K., Ogbulu, U. (2019). The practice of inclusive representation in Nigeria's bureaucracy: The federal character principle experience. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 5(1), 1-21. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23311886.2019.1601545>.
- Iheriohanma, E.B.J. (2012). Ndi-Igbo and the quest for socio-political empowerment in the Nigerian nation: A reflection. *Colloquim*

(ONUGAOTU) Paper with the theme: "OKEZUO OGBUU ALAA" presented at the 2012 Ahiajioku Lecture Festival, Thursday 22nd November, published by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Owerri, Imo State, Nigeria.

Ilogu, E. (1974). Christianity and Ibo culture. Brill Archive.

Isichei, E. (1977). A history of the Igbo people. New York: Macmillan.

Itumo, A., Nwobashi, H.N., and Offor, E.O. (2018). Marginalization of Igbo people in Nigerian state: Myth or reality? *Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research*, 26 (4), 395-409.

Iwuadighi, S. (1997). Origin or genealogy of the Igbo people of Nigeria. Vienna: The University of Vienna.

Jacobs, D. (1987). The brutality of nations. *International Relief*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. (1971). Crisis and conflict in Nigeria: A documentary sourcebook, volume 2. Oxford University Press.

Madiebo, A.A. (1980). The Nigerian revolution and the Biafran war. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Company Limited.

Merton, R.K. (1938). Social structure and anomie. *American Sociological Review*, 3: 672- 682.

Metz, H.C. (1991). A country study and its environment: Census: Library of Congress. <http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/>.

Nigeria at 58: See the men who fought for Nigeria's independence (2021, July 18). Nairaland <http://www.nairaland.com/4762758/nigeriaat58-see-5-men-fought>.

Nkwede, J.O. (2017). Federalism and state creation in Nigeria. *African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)*, 6(1):70-80.

Nkwede, J.O., and Nwodom, D.U. (2020). The Nigerian state and Biafran separatist movement: Contending issues and remediation. *Public Affairs and Infoscience Research (PAIR) Journal*, 2(1):111-122.

Nkwede, J.O., Dauda, K.O., and Orija, A.O. (2018). Federalism and contenting issues in contemporary Nigeria: Mapping alternative perspectives for a neo-federalist paradigm. *Asia Social Science*, 14(10):111-119.

- Nsoedo, E.E. (2019). The marginalization of the Igbo people in Nigeria's political and economic sectors: What is the way forward? *Open Journal of Social Sciences*, 7(7):427-437.
- Nwankwo, A. A. (1972). Nigeria: The challenge of Biafra. New York: David Philip Publishers.
- Nwobashi, H.N. (2014). Igbo political elites and movement for the actualization of sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB), 1999-2012. *African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)*, 6(2):54-69.
- Obi-Ani, P. (2009). Post-civil war political and economic reconstruction of Igbo land, 1970-1983. Nsukka: Great AP Publishers Ltd.
- Okaneme, G. (2014). Marginalization of some ethnic nationalities in Nigeria: the Igbo experience. *International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 8(1): 43-47.
- Okonkwo, J.I. (1996). Nri myth of origin: An Aro problem review. Universitat Koln.
- Okorie, I. (1983). The history of the Igbos and the chronology of events. Enugu: Cecta Publication.
- Olusanya, G.O. (1973). The second world war and politics in Nigeria, 1939-1953. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
- Olutayo, O. A. (1999). The Igbo entrepreneurs in the political economy of Nigeria. *African Studies Monographs*, 20(3): 147-174. Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan.
- Onwuejiogwu, M. (1981). An Igbo civilization: Nri kingdom and hegemony. London: Ethiope Publication Corp.
- Ozigbo, I. R. A. (1988). Roman Catholicism in south eastern Nigeria, 1885-1931: A study in colonial evangelism. Onitsha: Etukokwu Publishers.
- Richard, A., Sonia, B., Marinella, L., and Una, O. (2017). First and second generation impacts of the Biafran war. IZA Institute of Labour Economics, Bonn, Germany, *Discussion Paper Series*.
- Rose, J.D. (1982). Outbreaks, the sociology of collective behaviour. New York: Free Press.
- Runciman, G.W. (1966). *Relative deprivation and social justice: A study of*

*attitudes to social inequality in twentieth-century England*. California: University of California Press.

Saro-Wiwa, N. (2012). There was a country: A personal history of Biafra by Chinua Achebe-Review. *The Guardian*, 27<sup>th</sup> March.

Sklar, R.L. (1967). Nigerian politics in perspectives. *Government and Opposition*, 2(4):534-539.

Stremlau, J.J. (2015). *The international politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Talbot, P. (1926). The peoples of southern Nigeria: A sketch of their history, ethnology, and languages, with an abstract of the 1921 census. *Nature*, 121, 975-977.

Thurstan, S. (1973). *Africa and the origin of man*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.

Thurstan, S. (ed). (1975). *Discovering Nigeria's past*. Ibadan: OUP.

Udeajah, G. (2017). Failure of Gowon's three Rs, cause of separatist groups. *The Guardian*.

Ukpong, I.I. (1975). Economic recovery in the eastern states of Nigeria. *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 5(1):45-53.