**Learning to Solve Africa's Problems by Africans: Innovations for Addressing the Canker of Corruption**

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# **Abstract**

There is a global consensus that addressing corruption and building good governance are pre-requisites for developing people, markets and the environment. Many researches on corruption and institutions measuring corruption perceptions have rated many African countries as being corrupt and suggestions for addressing corruption have been drawn mainly from developed countries without significant recourse to Africa’s specific peculiarity. This paper raises the question on whether African governments and its people are completely adamant to the problem of corruption. The paper therefore explored endogenous innovations in organisational practices, developed within African countries aimed at stifling corruption, factors stimulating the development of such innovations and how these innovations may be improved. The paper used secondary data and interviews with key informants in three African countries: Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya. Endogenous innovations against corruption in Africa are mainly spearheaded by individuals as additional measures to government anti-corruption strategies. While a few of the innovations are crude in nature and may inflict punishment on a few individuals as scapegoats, they have however restraint and compelled attitudinal change among possible culprits to a large extent. Africa needs to raise a critical mass of individuals with appropriate thinking capacities and innovativeness to sustain the momentum generated by the innovations and to achieve wider impact.

**Keywords:** Corruption, Endogenous innovations, Africa’s sustainable development

# **Introduction**

Corruption has long been a favourite topic of foreign news reports on Africa, with bribery, embezzlement, theft of public property, and the squandering of scarce resources commonly put forward as the bane of the continent’s economic progress, political stability and sustainable development. Although corruption is universal and cannot be expressed as being peculiar to African countries, what is perhaps peculiar is the monumental dimension it has taken in recent years which tend to portray corruption as the defining aspect of African nations. Worst still is the growing tolerance and acceptance of the canker as an inevitable and integral part of the African social fabric.

In contemporary Africa, every institution has an unenviable record of corruption; the police, army, legislature, universities, customs, immigration, private organizations and most unfortunately, the religious institutions. Thus, corruption is being endorsed as a normative or legitimate means of having one’s share of the “national cake” (Adelakun, 2001). The changing social value systems of the African society and the subsequent breakdown of moral standards, western civilization, education and the coming of foreign religions are sociological factors underlining the pervasiveness of corruption in Africa (Ladele and Fadairo, 2013). Others have explained the scenario from politico-economical viewpoint thus holding population upsurge, resource allocation and lopsided wealth creation and distribution as contributory to increasing corruption on the continent.

There is no doubt that many African countries are engaging in measures to fight corruption. Notable among these is the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. In addition, several African countries have legal frameworks for stifling corruption through the establishment of anti-corruption commissions and passage of Freedom of Information Bill. However, the fact remains that more needs to be done as Africa’s progress is still hampered with corruption. Consequently, several measures are being taken by individuals and organizations in African countries to help stifle the canker. This paper reviewed the current state of corruption in Africa and the effect on sustainable development. It also explored endogenous measures for stifling its further spread in Africa and factors underlining these measures.

Most African countries receiving assistance from the international community over the past two decades have invested a lot of resources into enacting and establishing legislations, policies and anti-corruption agencies to fight corruption. However, not much has been achieved with all these investments (Hawkings, 2013). Many scholars concur that the anticorruption reforms fail largely because they stem from the principal-agent theory (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2010). This theory leaves the power to implement and deal with corruption in the hands of politicians and bureaucrats who rise to their positions on the back of corruption and therefore have no moral justification to fight it. Another reason for failure of anti-corruption policies is the systemic nature of corruption in Africa. In many African countries or societies, corruption has been institutionalised and has become the norm to the extent that those who indulge in corrupt acts have internalised such behaviour (Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002). Unfortunately, many of the anti-corruption policies are built on an individualistic, legalistic conception of corruption and therefore do not capture all the aspects of corruption especially those promoted by social networks (Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002). Thus, there is the need for a new wave of thinking into the ways to deal with corruption in Africa. Also, the

argument that effective fight against corruption in Africa requires African solutions (Hawkings, 2013) suggests the relevance of endogenous management practices as the springboard for developing appropriate and sustainable control measures in these countries.

It is against this background that this paper looks at innovative practices, developed within African countries aimed at: (i) exploring innovative practices that stifle corruption and promotes transparency, (ii) identifying factors stimulating the development of such innovative practices; and (iii) examining ways of improving existing innovations for addressing corruption. In this paper, three countries are used as case studies to examine the practices that seem to stifle corruption in those countries.

# **Concept of Corruption, Effect on African Governance and Sustainable Development**

Several attempts have been made to define corruption in literature leading to diverse interpretations of the phenomenon. Corruption, therefore, may mean different things depending on the observer’s discipline, cultural background, and political affiliation or ideology and may vary spatially and temporally (Gerring and Thacker, 2004). Corruption can be defined as a deviant behaviour by an individual or individuals for the attainment of some socially and/or legally prohibited favours (Dwivedi, 1967). Weber (2005), on the other hand viewed corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain”, while Transparency International defined corruption as “the abuse of trusted authority for private gain” (Harrison 2007 and Ajaz and Ahmad, 2010, Jain, 2001). The most commonly used definition is “the use of public office for private advantage” (Tanzi, 1998). USAID (2005) followed a broader perspective by defining corruption as the misuse of entrusted power or authority (by heritage, education, marriage, election, appointment or whatever else) for private gain. This broader definition covers not only the politician and the public servant, but also the private business sector, associations, and society at large. A much more scientific definition of the concept was developed by Duyne (2001, pp 10) who sees corruption as an “improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which a decision-maker consents to deviate or demands deviation from the criterion which should rule his or her decision-making, in exchange for a reward or for the promise or expectation of a reward, while these motives influencing his or her decision-making cannot be part of the justification of the decision”. This paper uses the definition of corruption as the use of public office for private advantage (Tanzi, 1998, Weber, 2005, Harrison, 2007).

Jain (2001) identified three types of corruption, namely: political/grand corruption, bureaucratic corruption and legislative corruption. Harrison (2007) assimilates corruption with poverty as both make people’s lives miserable. While supporting the institutionalization of anti-corruption efforts to overcome colonial legacy and the system of patronage, Dumor (2005) advises that corruption should not be seen as a single event, but be looked at as a system that perpetuates poverty, feeds on it and eventually destroys the foundations of the state and democracy.

Corruption assumes all sorts of forms in different locations throughout the world. The level of sophistication pertaining to the specific environment extensively defines the modus operandi for all corrupt practices. The more common dimensions of corruption in Africa identified in the literature are purchase of votes, rigging, cross-carpeting, annulment of election results, bribery, nepotism, extortion, employment patronage, embezzlement, influence peddling, absenteeism/habitual lateness for work, tax evasion, examination malpractices, taking of commissions/gifts, use of false weight, campaign finance abuse, clientelism, cronyism, fraud, graft, kickbacks, misappropriation, misconduct, rent seeking, scandal, side payments, special interest politics, theft, venality, and delays (Gerring and Thancker, 2004, Harrison, 2007, Apaza, 2009 Olopoenia, 1998, Adelakun, 2001, Attafuah, 2002).

Widespread corruption and weak governance have derailed African countries’ efforts to reach Millennium Development Goals. For instance, since the 1990s, “good governance” has been a conditionality for aid disbursement from donor agencies to aid recipient countries to ensure that development assistance is used effectively. Even the Glean eagles communiqué of 2005 tied donor funding to low income countries committed to growth and poverty reduction, democratic, accountable and transparent government as well as to sound public financial management (Nanda, 2006). The World Bank proposes the six governance indicators: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Apaza (2009) however warns that the accuracy in comparing governance over time and across countries through aggregate indicators is unreliable.

Just as corruption, definitions on governance vary. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzz (2004, pp 15) defined “governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”(the process by which governments are elected and replaced, the capacity of the government to formulate and implement social policies and the respect of citizens and state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions)”. Governance is the method of “governing” that is proposed for obtaining lasting economic, social and institutional development, promoting healthy equilibrium amongst the state, civil society and the economic market and generating expressly for this purpose active involvement by citizens (Ajaz and Ahmad, 2010). Ajaz and Ahmad (2010) warn that corruption should not be dealt with in isolation as it is a part of the broader issue of governance and public management. Accordingly, good governance refers to combating corruption, nepotism, bureaucracy and mismanagement and promoting transparency, accountability and proper procedures (Doornbos, 1995). Governance is the manner in which power and authority are exercised for development in the management of a country’s economic and social resources (World Bank, 1992). There is however, no consensus about the contents of good governance and hence no universally accepted objective standards to link government, political and administrative practices with it (Doornbos, 2004).

Gerring and Thacker (2004) examined the relationship between corruption and basic level political institutions and found out that federal and presidential systems are more open and transparent as they multiply the number of actors involved in the policy process. Similarly, inter-party competition, with multiple veto points as protection against the passage of corrupt legislation leads to better governance and is therefore essential for eliminating corruption. Conversely, openness alone does not guarantee that the corrupt behaviours will be prevented and punished due to the fact that government corruption mostly concerns bureaucratic actors rather than elected officials. Corrupt actors may also be shielded by competing sources of power that make it difficult to assign individual and institutional responsibilities (Gerring and Thacker, 2004).

McAuslan (1996) mentioned that corruption is rampant in Africa not because African leaders and governments are incompetent, corrupt or brutal due to due to some cultural trait, household customary practices or an inability to adjust traditional styles of rule to large scale society, but because they want power and wealth for themselves and their families. He insisted that in cases where corruption has been so institutionalized and presidentialized to affect all aid programmes, it may be necessary to stop aid completely. He observed the need for monitoring as countries tend to relapse in their fight against corruption. Samson (2005) argued that the field of anti-corruption has also become very complex and involves the confluence of money and power with strongly held moral and ethical beliefs. Even those with strong moral imperatives have been entangled in the struggle for resources (financial and technical grants) using simple formulae and descriptions of corruption, hence the need to carefully study the field of corruption (Harrison, 2007).

## Emerging Issues and Study Gaps

The preceding section shows that public and private sector initiatives are still inadequate if not supported by the political class. Secondly, anti-corruption efforts should be institutionalized and all actors including both the public and private sector/individuals be involved for monitoring and sustainability. It is also important to control the wealth of the political class and their families so that people do not see politics as a way of enriching themselves as is common in Africa.

Harrison (2007) advised that as corruption is an evolving subject, a closer look at corruption is important to monitor the trends. Similarly, there is no consensus on the criteria for measuring good governance (Doornbos, 2004). Most studies on corruption also focus on institutionalized efforts to fight the vice and the role of the private sector and individuals in fighting corruption has not been exhausted. An investigation of these options is necessary for sustainability effectiveness. Contrary to Gerring and Thacker (2004), in Africa, presidentialism is still associated with massive corruption, while remarkable unreliability has been observed in using aggregate indicators, thus the need for more research on endogenous methods against corruption. A multidisciplinary approach is recommended as in some cases, even the media provides false information, depending on who pays for the service (Dumor, 2005). According to Dumor (2005), the focus on corruption should be on the developing world due to the severity and nature of impacts.

# **Data and Methodology**

Although the study of corruption has a long history in economics, related empirical work on quantifying the extent of corruption and putting monetary value on its economic effects has been limited. This is hardly surprising since corruption is clandestine. Also determining just how efficient government institutions are is not what would be called exact science. As a consequence, corruption is notoriously hard to measure and empirical economic research on the question is fairly meagre.

This study was carried out in Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya and used mixed methods to address the objectives raised in the introduction. These countries are part of the five partner countries in Education for Sustainable Development in Africa (EDSA) programme and were selected for preliminary investigation. The findings of this investigation will serve as a springboard for full scale study in other African countries. The study design was exploratory and used a combination of both primary and secondary data sources. Primary data were gathered from desk study, observations, survey and in-depth interviews in selected organisations. Desk study focused mainly on literature, reports and corruption related issues from major newspapers of the three countries. In Nigeria, 174 public officers in the Ministry of upper Agriculture were interviewed and interviews were conducted with key informants purposively sampled based on their insights on the innovations identified. In Ghana, a total of 37 key informant interviews were held with officials of selected public institutions. The public institutions were purposively selected based on preliminary findings from the desk study about their involvement in corruption related issues. In Kenya, only desk study was carried out. The secondary data was mainly from Transparency International and government statistics.

# **Case Study of Corruption in Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya**

Compared to the global corruption average, most African countries have poor scores, an evidence of how corruption is deeply embedded into the governance systems in the continent. Table 1 below explores corruption levels in different sectors in Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria as comparable to the global average. All the three countries exhibit figures that are way above the global corruption.

**Table 1: Percentage of respondents perceiving different sectors as corrupt, Transparency International Global corruption barometer**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Institution** | **Global** | **Ghana** | **Kenya** | **Nigeria** |
| Political Parties | 47 | 76 | 53 | 94 |
| Legislature | 6.5 | 57 | 68 | 73 |
| Military | 0 | 29 | 43 | 45 |
| NGOs | 0 | 19 | 19 | 32 |
| Media | 3.7 | 47 | 12 | 33 |
| Religious bodies | 2.8 | 21 | 15 | 24 |
| Business | 2.8 | 38 | 29 | 41 |
| Education sector | 0 | 66 | 37 | 54 |
| Judiciary | 18.7 | 71 | 58 | 66 |
| Health services | 5.6 | 37 | 43 | 41 |
| Police | 33.6 | 92 | 95 | 92 |
| Public servants | 6.5 | 59 | 59 | 69 |

**Source: TI, 2013. Global Corruption Barometer 2013;** [**www.transparency.org**](http://www.transparency.org) **/gcb2013/results**

The impact of corruption on the African investment climate, poverty reduction efforts, public service delivery and sustainable development is summarized by Mongo (2013, pp 9) as follows: **“When public money is stolen for private gain, it means fewer resources are available to build schools, hospitals, roads and water treatment facilities.** Likewise,**when foreign aid is diverted into private bank accounts, major infrastructure projects come to a screeching halt. Corruption enables fake or sub-standard medicines to be dumped on the market and hazardous waste to be dumped in landfill sites and in oceans.**The vulnerable suffer first and worst”. Literature shows other ways corruption may affect sustainable development as including: (i) distortion of portfolio of public spending by shifting resources away from education and towards public consumption (Tanzi, 1998); (ii) corruption, through the sale of investment licenses or simply through creation of red tape and rent-seeking, serves as a tax on investment and consequently reduces investment on economic activities (Aidt, 2011); (iii) corruption tends to increase public investment associated with low operation and maintenance expenditures and with poor quality of infrastructure(Tanzi and Davoodi 1998); and (iv) resource abundance (such as crude oil in Nigeria, gold in Ghana) fosters a ‘rentier’ economy with rampant corruption and poorly developed institutions (Aidt, 2011).

The extent of corruption in Africa can be seen from the many years of insignificant improvements of corruption perceptions, with many countries scoring dismally. Figure 1 provides recent corruption perception statistics of Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria and indicates that little or no improvement has been made.

**Figure 1: Corruption perception indices from Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria (Data source: Transparencey International, 2013)**

Corruption may be as old as mankind; however evidences abound that the original African societies were less prone to corrupt tendencies. The famous era of trade by barter where goods or services were easily exchanged between individuals without the use of money and the later trade of agricultural produce for certain amount of cowries (placed beside the produce by the roadside), which were honestly transacted usually in the absence of the buyer are indications of ingenuity of transparency in the original African system. The current situation however is that among the 177 countries of the world rated by the Transparency International (TI) in 2013, 90% of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) nations score below 50 on the scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). These results place Africa far behind other regions of the world such as EU & Western Europe, Asia pacific, America, Middle East and North Africa. And while a lot is being done to reduce corruption, the results have not been promising as the case of Nigeria indicates in Table 2.

**Table 2: Nigerian Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 1996-2010**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **CPI** | **No. of countries evaluated** | **Rating** |
| 1996 | 1.2 | 54 | 54 |
| 1997 | 1.3 | 52 | 52 |
| 1998 | 1.9 | 85 | 81 |
| 1999 | 1.9 | 99 | 98 |
| 2000 | 1.9 | 90 | 90 |
| 2001 | 1.6 | 102 | 100 |
| 2002 | 1.7 | 91 | 90 |
| 2003 | 1.4 | 133 | 132 |
| 2004 | 1.6 | 145 | 144 |
| 2005 | 1.9 | 158 | 154 |
| 2006 | 2.2 | 163 | 142 |
| 2007 | 2.2 | 183 | 127 |
| 2008 | 2.2 | 183 | 127 |
| 2009 | 2.7 | 180 | 130 |
| 2010 | 2.4 | 178 | 134 |
| 2011 | 2.4 | 183 | 143 |
| 2012 | 27\* | 176 | 139 |
| 2013 | 25\* | 177 | 144 |

**Data source: Transparency International. Accessed January 10, 2014 http:/ / www.transparency.org/cpi/results (Note: \* Score is over 100)**

As Table 2 shows, the level of corruption has not changed significantly in Nigeria and this is the trend in other African countries. Many institutions in Africa have come out to fight corruption, but the problem is very deeply encroached in governance institutions that fighting its causes remains a nightmare in Africa and has enabled it to thrive unabatedly.

## Endogenous Innovations for Curbing Corruption: Lessons from Nigeria

### Viral Youth Movement Using Social Media Network

The youths in recent times have cultivated the attitude of covert filming incidences of corruption (using mobiles) such as police trying to extort bribes from motorists; and posting the video on the internet where the footage is further publicized by media organizations to pressurize the relevant authorities to take appropriate action. Some recent cases in this regard include the video footage of (i) a police sergeant demanding a bribe of N25, 000 from a motorist at the Lagos Airport and (ii) two traffic police women who were videotaped receiving N100 bribe from a bus driver in Lagos. Following 120,000 views on YouTube, tens of thousands of tweets, and airings on every national Television Channel, authorities were goaded into taking rare action (Theguardian.com, 2013) (Figure 2). This measure is generally credited because of its ability to guarantee anonymity of the reporter of the corrupt act and was found to have reduced tendency for bribe taking among members of the police force.



**Figure 2: Newspaper report on the dismissal of sergeant Omezele. Source: The Punch Newspapers, Thursday August 8, 2013. P4**

### Removal of Unauthorized Roadblocks and Police Checkpoints

Nigerian bribe-seeking police collected more than 2.9M Euros from illegal checkpoints in the year 2012 (Theguardian.com, 2013). In response to this growing corruption in the Nigeria Police Force, the newly appointed Inspector General of Police- Mr. Mohammed Abubakar ordered the immediate removal of all illegitimate road blocks across the nation(Sahara reporter, 2012) ; a gesture which was initially opposed by the gamut of beneficiaries of illegal gains of self-authorized roadblocks. One year later report, as seen in Figure 3, shows that the withdrawal of Police roadblocks reduced corruption in the Nigeria Police Force by 80%. Interview with motorists in Ibadan also confirmed this report as they expressed there was a significant reduction in amount they paid as bribe to police men since illegal roadblocks were removed.



**Figure 3: Post evaluation report on state of corruption in the Nigeria Police Force after removal of illegal roadblocks. Source: The Vanguard Newspapers, Saturday May 4, 2013. P55**

### Traditional/Indigenous Control Measures

The incessant clash between peasant farmers and Fulani herdsmen has become a recurring phenomenon in most farming communities in Nigeria. The clash usually arises when Fulani herdsmen tresspass into and allow their cattle to graze on the farmers’ unharvested fields leaving huge damage on their crop investment. Sometimes, farmers are attacked on the field and their women raped in the process. Farmers interviewed in the study remarked that “the police and local traditional rulers who are expected to protect us have been handicapped as a result of regular royalties they receive from the herdsmen”. The inability of the government and relevant authorities to curb this corrupt practice has therefore prompted the development of certain innovative measures by the farmers to control tresspass into their farmlands by the herdsmen. These are categorised as: Control measure using powdered pepper applied in bands along the perimeter of the cultivated farmland. After sniffing the powdered pepper, cattle suddenly become restless; a condition which is thought to prevent their tresspassing into the farm. Also, there are punitive measures using local concoctions. Farmers collect the dung of cattle suspected to have tresspased into their farmlands and mix it with certain local concoctions so that the cattle dies of dysentry after a few weeks.


Also, another dimension of corruption in agriculture is the pilferage/theft of crops, produce and or livestock from the farmers’ field for sale or direct consumption. A similitude of cultural measure used to scare away pests of crops from farmlands is widely used by farmers particularly in the south western part of Nigeria to ward off intending culprits. In most small-holder farms, a combination of certain items (usually red tape, calabash and animal hoofs and sometimes bunch of grasses) believed to be protective charms were observed tied to a conspicuous tree or placed on harvested produce that were waiting to be transported to the markets for sale (Figure 3). Some farmers in addition to the charms prepared notices beside their farms with precautionary statements such as “*se iwaibajeninuokoyii, kiosisofoemi*” meaning that any corrupt acts in this farm will lead to loss of lives on the perpetrators. In-depth interviews with some farmers at the sites visited in Oke-Ogun area of Oyo State revealed that the use of charms produces better results than many other physical security measures due to its ability to give instant judgment on culprits of corrupt practices.



**Figure 4: A protective charm “aale” hung on a tree close to harvested produce on a farm in Kishi, Oyo State, Nigeria.**

### Public Enlightenment through Entertainment Education

Entertainment-Education (EE) is the process of purposely designing and implementing a media message both to entertain and educate, in order to increase audience knowledge about an educational issue, create favourable attitudes and change overt behaviour. These opportunities offered by EE strategy to promote social change are currently being tapped in Nigeria to promote civic responsibility and anti-corruption attitude through programmes on television and radio. For example, ‘*Geegles’* and *Gbagan-Gbagan* are radio serial broadcasts in Pidgin English on a national radio network programme. It focuses on discouraging corrupt practices and promoting citizenship education among the populace. Also, several non-governmental organizations in the nation have contributed significantly towards increasing awareness on corruption among the populace using various print (see Figure 5) and electronic media, as well as community theatre, puppets and songs.



**Figure 5: A bill board campaigning against corruption erected along the road in Bodija, Ibadan, Oyo State.**

## Endogenous Innovations for Curbing Corruption: Lessons from Ghana

### Video Supported Investigative Journalism

The recent use of video documentaries provided by some journalists to support claims of corruption has heightened interest in the issue from the grass-roots to the presidency. The videos showed the faces of perpetrators clearly while naming and shaming them. Though these documentaries may not necessarily result in people being convicted, they stand as strong evidence for investigations and prosecutions. These videos are also made public, thus reducing the tendency of sweeping issues under the carpet. Notable among this video supported-investigative journalism is


the work of Anas Aremeyaw Anasin Ghana (Figure 6). He works as an under-cover journalist, disguised as anyone, from a psychiatric patient to a customer at any public institution, with hidden cameras, to provide evidence of corruption and injustice in the society (Asiedu, 2012). Interviews conducted with officers of the public service in Kumasi confirmed that this turn of events has affected their attitudes towards corruption. An officer indicated, “you may never know when ‘an Anas’ may be watching. Report showed that Chief Executive Officers of various organisations were made more alert due to the outcome of investigative journalism (see Figure 7). Similarly, Figure 8 shows how a former president of Ghana paid an unannounced visit to Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority to initiate investigations and immediate sanctions against perpetrators of corrupt practices, following the airing of one of such documentaries (Gobah and Russel, 2011).



**Figure 6: Report on an investigative tape recording of AnasAremeyawAnas. Source: The Mirror (Newspaper), Saturday January 14, 2012. P3**



**Figure 7: Impact of Anas’ investigative video journalism on the attitudes of CEOs. Source: The Spectator (Newspaper), Saturday May 8, 2010. P3**



**Figure 8: An unannounced visit by Ex-President Mills to Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority following Anas’ revelation. Source: Daily Graphic (Newspaper), Saturday February 5, 2011. P1**

### Live Telecast of Public Hearings on Management of State Funds

The Government of Ghana has a Public Accounts Committee (PAC), which works with the Auditor General to oversee the management of public funds. The committee invites top management of Metropolitan, Municipal and District assemblies to their sittings to account for the management of public funds. The sittings of PAC, though opened to the public, were monitored by only few interested parties who took the pains to attend their hearings. Recently however, the hearings were telecast live on national television. This has given greater transparency to the management of public funds and enhanced accountability on the conduct of public business. It has also afforded all citizens the opportunity to witness the hearings. This turn of events is noted to have created a greater sense of accountability among senior public servants.

### Media-based Interactive Educational and Advocacy Platforms

A group of media stations across the nation (including ETV, Happy FM, Anigye FM) under the Ghana Media Alliance, in collaboration with the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition have launched an anti-corruption initiative dubbed “Speak-up”. This initiative seeks to encourage citizens to stand and speak against corrupt practices, during live radio and television discussions. Citizens can interact on all mobile telecommunication networks and on Facebook/social media. This initiative specifically targets the education and health sectors. Such interactive platforms seem to be making an impact. An example was seen in the educational sector, during the admission of students to Senior High Schools for the 2013/2014 academic year. Using the interactive platforms provided through the media, parents complained about corrupt practices in the admission processes, requiring parents to pay unapproved fees. The Educational Sector Minister responded by issuing directives on approved fees, which empowered parents to prevent extortion. Consequently, the Headmaster of Toase Senior High School in the Ashanti Region, for example, has been asked to proceed on leave for collecting unapproved fees, following reportage and investigations. An investigation launched by a journalist at Joy FM into the operations of Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) and Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Authority (GYEEDA) revealed corrupt practices leading to the abrogation of government contracts with some companies and certain individuals asked to refund moneys to the state while criminal investigations are on-going into the matters.

### Use of Arts to Engender Youth and Grass-root Involvement

Increasingly, the youth and even children are being enrolled unto anti-corruption efforts. In Ghana, art is being employed as a means to educate and draw the attention of younger people to the problem of corruption. Cartoons are being used to paint vivid pictures of the problem in children’s newspapers and national dailies (Figure 9). Again, art is being used as a medium through which children and youth are engaged to demonstrate their understanding of the problem of corruption and how it could be addressed. This is done through inter-schools arts competitions, which also attract recognition and reward.



**Figure 9: Cartoon depicting corruption. Source: Daily Graphic**

**(Newspaper)**

### Grassroots Mobilization for Periodic Rallies

People at the grassroots level are now being empowered to organise demonstrations periodically against corruption. During these demonstrations, they demand specific changes, particularly in the institutional structures to ensure better and more independent handling of corruption cases (Aziz, 2013). Though some of these grassroots demonstrations are sometimes initiated by groups with political interests (see Figure 10), an interview with an expert on transparency and corruption issues in Ghana emphasised that they could still make an impact in addressing corruption. He explained that politicians are used to, and could ignore newspaper publications and discussions on the media but they are very uncomfortable with grassroots demonstrations. He indicated that whenever the citizens demonstrate, it is seen as a potential threat to votes and to their political position.



**Figure 10: Grassroots demonstration against corruption by PPP supporters. Source: Daily Graphic (Newspaper), Thursday October 3, 2013.**

### Establishment of Anti-corruption Desks or Informant Structures in Public/Private Organisations

Over the past five years, some public and non-governmental organisations have established anti-corruption desks or centres within their organisations. These desks are to take complaints on bribery, extortion, non-adherence to due process and other corrupt practices. Other public institutions also have under-cover informants within their organisations, who provide information on corruption as a starting point for investigations. The Forestry Commission of Ghana, for example, makes use of this approach. They also have informants among local people in forest fringe communities who give information particularly about corruption cases related to illegal timber harvesting, transportation and trade. After investigations, staff at fault are sometimes interdicted or transferred to non-timber production areas. Interviews with a staff of the Commission at the district level (within Ashanti and Eastern Regions) indicated that the use of anonymous informants is effective in creating alertness of the possibility of facing sanctions for corruption. They intimated that among themselves, they use the phrase “if you are not careful you will be thrown to ‘Siberia’ ” to caution one another of the possibility of unfavourable transfers.

### Proactive Client Empowerment

Some organisations actively empower their clients to avoid becoming victims of corruption. They do so by putting up public notices in their offices to warn clients and/or by providing clients with information on due processes for obtaining products and services. Apart from empowering clients, this proactive approach also reduces the possibility of public officers demanding extra monies directly or indirectly. The Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA) in Kumasi for instance has put up notices in its offices, asking people not to pay extra monies for services rendered and for people to avoid transacting business with unauthorised middle men. They also have a public address system that talks about these activities to customers. DVLA is noted to have middle men extorting money from vehicle owners and drivers to facilitate their licensing processes. Interviews with vehicle owners and drivers visiting the DVLA in Kumasi revealed that with interventions, they do not feel obliged to pay any extra monies than the approved rates.

### Endogenous Innovations for Curbing Corruption: Lessons from Kenya

It was difficult to point out the endogenous initiatives in Kenya as the country has given priority to institutionalisation of the anti-corruption efforts. A few civil society organizations participate independently, while the private sector provides information on corruption. Quah (1987) proposed that for the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures should depend on first, the adequacy of the measures themselves in terms of comprehensiveness in scope and powers, and secondly, on the level of commitment of the political leaders to the goal of eradicating corruption in the country concerned. Kenya largely relies on the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2011, established under Article 79 of the Kenyan Constitution.

### Anti-corruption Campaigns by Government Parastatals

Many government offices display notices on corruption, for instance, a number of government institutions have displayed Boards declaring the environments corruption free. Figure 10 shows notices which are used to encourage the public to report corruptive cases and maintain that curbing corruption is a responsibility for all.

**Figure 10: Notices indicating corruption free zones**

Such a process faces many challenges, particularly, where the political leadership may not appear to be fully committed to the fight against the vice.

### Innovative Anti-Corruption Drive in Kenya

Innovative anti-corruption drive in Kenya is largely driven by private sector organisations such as the MARS Group Kenya, Movement for Political Accountability (MOPA), Centre for Law and Research International Kenya (Clarion Kenya), East Africa Association (EAA), Institute of Certified Public Secretaries (ICPS), and Centre for Corporate governance (CCG). These organisations create awareness and stimulate the public to demand for accountability from Kenya's leadership. These organisations use websites and reports on corruption from various sectors, education, research, advocacy, monitoring and evaluation as tools.

### Factors Stimulating the Need for the Innovations

Several public strategies and campaigns to curb corruption have been launched during the last three decades in most African countries. In Nigeria, strategies include: War Against Indiscipline (WAI) (1984), the National Orientation Movement (NOM) (1986), the Mass Mobilisation for Social Justic (1987), War Against Indiscipline (1996), **Code of Conduct Bureau** (1999), establishment of anti corruption commissions (2000), Public Procurement Act (2007), and Freedom of Information Bill (2011). In Ghana, there was the Public Procurement Act (2003), Anti-Money Laundering Act (2002), Whistle blower Act (2006), Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO).

These strategies have however performed dismally in addressing corruption. Literature and interaction with stakeholders in Ghana revealed the following as responsible factors: political and partisan interference, inadequate evidence for prosecution, poor monitoring structure/punitive measure, weak judiciary system and entrenched culture of corruption. Furthermore, a survey carried out among 174 public officers in the Ministry of Agriculture in Nigeria (Table 3) indicated insincerity of the government, insecurity of informants, low deterrent, and lack of virile social movement respectively as the most critical factors that stimulated the need for alternative measures.

**Table 3: The fight against corruption in Nigeria is not working because of the following factors**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Factors** | **Very large extent** | **Large extent** | **Limited extent** | **Not a factor** | **Mean** | **Rank** |
|  | % | % | % | % |
| Insincerity of Government | 62.6 | 25.3 | 11.5 | 0.6 | 3.5 | 1 |
| Insecurity of informants | 48.3 | 41.4 | 8.0 | 2.3 | 3.4 | 2 |
| Bureaucratic inefficiency | 40.8 | 36.8 | 21.3 | 1.1 | 3.1 | 5 |
| Low deterrent | 48.3 | 29.9 | 17.2 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 3 |
| Lack of virile social movements | 46.0 | 25.3 | 26.4 | 2.3 | 3.2 | 3 |
| Poor accountability mechanism | 32.2 | 37.9 | 28.7 | 1.1 | 3.0 | 6 |
| Lack of information on rules and procedures | 26.4 | 41.4 | 24.7 | 7.5 | 2.9 | 10 |
| Unclear rules with loopholes for manipulation | 29.3 | 42.5 | 24.7 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 6 |
| Weak leadership at all levels | 29.9 | 46.6 | 17.8 | 5.7 | 3.0 | 6 |
| Non-enforcement of rules and procedures | 32.2 | 41.4 | 20.1 | 6.3 | 3.0 | 6 |
| Poor management systems | 26.4 | 35.1 | 32.2 | 6.3 | 2.8 | 11 |
| Strong protective social net of the accused | 24.1 | 31.0 | 34.5 | 10.3 | 2.7 | 12 |
| Weak and ineffective media | 23.0 | 27.6 | 27.0 | 22.4 | 2.5 | 13 |

Source: Fadairo, O.S. (2013). Perceived Level of Corruption among Public Officers in the Agricultural Sector in Southwestern Nigeria. Unpublished Ph.D theses in the Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. P136.

The findings that government’s insincerity and weak punitive measures against perpetrators are major factors is corroborated by ThisDay (2003)which revealed that no conviction was recorded out of the 942 petitions received by an anti-graft agency in Nigeria after its first three years of establishment. In a similar vein, in spite of the elaborate legal and institutional frameworks for addressing corruption in Ghana, there are only few successful prosecutions of corruption cases (Chêne, 2010). A household survey conducted by the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), the local chapter of Transparency International (TI) in 2011, found that the law enforcement agencies and public institutions entrusted to fight corruption are perceived the most corrupt in society (Figure 11). The survey showed that Police Service was the most corrupt institution in the country followed by customs and political parties respectively. The three arms of government, the Executive, the Judiciary and Parliament followed in that order.

**Figure 11: Public perception of corruption of various sectors in Ghana (%)**

These are among the institutions highly placed in the Ghanaian constitution to fight corruption, yet they are themselves perceived to be most corrupt. Over the past 5 years or more, the perception of the public on these institutions has not changed. In spite of the fact that these institutions and the government are perceived most corrupt, the public still had confidence in them to fight corruption. The five most trusted institutions to deal with corruption were the Executive, the state accountability institutions (Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Audit Service and Economic and Organised Crime Office), judiciary, media and Parliament (GII, 2011). However, cases in Ghana have not been punitive enough to deter perpetrators. One of the reasons often cited for the failure of governments to prosecute corrupt acts is the desire to remain in power (Norad, 2008). Electioneering campaigns in Ghana have become very expensive and politicians use all kinds of rent extraction methods to finance their campaigns (Norad, 2008). Therefore, the corrupt people use part of the booty to contribute to the campaigns. Thus, when the government is elected into office, they do not have the political will to prosecute these cases when they show up. On top of that, government is more often skewed towards these people who more often than not are party loyalists. This became evident in the Ghana Integrity Initiative’s survey on the award of government’s contracts as perceived by the society as shown in Table 4.

**Table 4: Perception on factors influencing the award of contracts**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Factors** | **Percentage** |
| Party Loyalty | 70 |
| Bribes | 52.7 |
| ethnicity/nepotism | 52.6 |
| Kickbacks | 43.7 |

**Source: (GII, 2011)**

Overall, 52.6% of respondents believed contracts were obtained through dubious means as in Table 4. With the government of the day paying lip service to corruption, more than 73% of the respondents believed individuals could make a difference in the fight against corruption (GII, 2011). Thus, the use of innovative and endogenous methods to tackle the vice is important.

# **Conclusion**

Endogenous innovations in Africa were mainly spearheaded by individuals and appear to be more effective in promoting transparency in developing countries. However, its current level of success may be viewed as inadequate to fully contain the monster of corruption giving current extent of corruption spread. Sustaining the current momentum therefore requires arousing the interests of more people, especially youths, in undercover journalism and training them on the use of various Information and Communication Technology tools in order to generate a critical mass required to engender a multiplier effect of success stories in various parts of these countries. Also, the crude nature of some strategies (i.e. use of protective charms) and the inability to appropriate the right kind of punishment to different degrees of corruption is a major weakness of these measures. Such measures may therefore not be encouraged especially when there are tendencies of erroneous apprehension of innocent citizens. Furthermore, making proactive client empowerment (public organisations sharing information on due processes for obtaining products and services) mandatory would further help to raise a virile anti-corruption movement and consequently reduce corruption in the form of extortion. The research also found that due to the multi-faceted nature of corruption, no one method can conclusively measure or aid in identifying corrupt practices and therefore it is recommended that an integration of different methods is necessary to fully unearth the canker of corruption. These methods should be chosen after a consideration of a number of methods based on the nature of corruption and cultural background of country concerned. Further research is required to establish the long-term impact of the endogenous innovations discussed in this paper.

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