

# Corruption, Democracy and Development: Lessons for Africa and Asia

Dhikru Adewale YAGBOYAJU

Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Nigeria

Email: aswaj2003@yahoo.com

## Abstract

This paper draws references from China and Nigeria; the two most populous countries and leading economies in the Asian and African continents, to examine the broad and deep relationships between both countries' supposed adoption of democracy, and their well acknowledged economic growth. Specifically, the paper examines the effects of the domination of the state and society in China by the China Communist Party (CCP) on the overall development of the country. It also interrogates why in Nigeria, despite the existence of multiple political parties, the party in power often dominates to such an extent that the opposition is largely ineffective. Essentially, the paper is literature based. It is not only descriptive, but also analytical. Its framework of analysis draws from several prominent historical and cultural perspectives on the subject matters of corruption, democracy and development from across the world's developed, developing and less developed economies.

**Keywords:** Corruption, Party System, Economic Growth, Development

## Introduction

There is hardly any change in the contemporary world that has been more significant than the global spread of democratic governance. As at 1974, "only 39 countries of the world over were ruled by constitutional

governments that held regular, competitive elections” (Lewis 2006: 9). Today, slightly more than four decades after, more than 120 governments are electoral democracies. This group accounts for about 60 per cent of the world’s independent nations, containing more than two-thirds of the world’s entire population (see Lewis, 2006: *ibid*). Among Africa’s multitude of countries, south of the Sahara, 44 were as recent as 1990 ruled by military governments, single-party or one-man regimes. By the end of the first decade in the twenty-first century, there were at least 20 electoral democracies in the region, along with many others that have made significant gains in political freedom and pluralism.

Quite importantly, the global spread of democracy, political liberalization and democratic government has created a tremendous window of possibilities even in countries like China and many others across Asia that were long dominated by autocrats and closed regimes. Democratic reforms have opened political space in which citizens can participate in governance and public affairs in general. Thus, the new high levels of freedom and institutions that accompany democratization or democratic governance, as the case may be in the different societies, provide important opportunities for holding leaders to account and promoting transparency of government. These “changes have taken root in dozens of countries and regions with different historical legacies and cultures and they have transformed political life in societies that just a short time ago seemed to be in the grip of dictators and single party states” (Lewis 2006: 9-10).

However, with particular focus on Nigeria and China, from Africa and Asia respectively, this paper argues that a change of regime does not automatically mean a sustainable improvement in the quality of governance. In fact, a study of sensitive political institutions such as political parties or the party systems and the legislatures in these countries should reveal that the difference between the current “democratic” dispensations and the former dictatorial regimes, particularly in respect of the guarantee for divergent views, is hardly more than six and half a dozen. This, for instance, implies that the difference between a system in which political parties are not recognized and the one which is dominated and totally controlled by a political party is insignificant, especially with regard to the impact which opposing views may or may not have.

It should be noted that pluralism, competition and freedom of expression are some of the major characteristics of democracy, which account for its popular classification as a form of government under which sustainable development is possible and the prevention or reduction of corruption more attainable, while the closed character of the one-man or one-party administration makes it more susceptible to corruption and lack of sustainable development even if such a system experiences economic growth.

In what specific ways should democracy, or indeed governance, operate so as to reduce corruption and enhance the attainment of development aspirations? What are the environmental peculiarities affecting this in Nigeria and China? What best practices can the two countries adopt from their counterparts across the globe, especially those with more liberal democratic systems? Before these questions are addressed, I should note the importance of a basic understanding of the key terms and concepts in the paper. Thus, the next section attempts to conceptualize these terms so as to deepen the understanding of their connections to the subject matter of the paper.

### **Conceptual Prologue**

This attempt to conceptualize the terms – corruption, democracy and development, is not to construct ultimate definitions for the terms. Rather, the conceptualization is to strengthen as well as deepen the understanding of the interconnections between these terms and their adoption in this paper for the analysis of the prevailing conditions in Nigeria and China.

Thus, to start with, corruption can simply be described as any action or “inaction”, which destroys, taints or debases the purity of any legitimate course, rule or regulation. It involves perversion and venality, and is most often conducted secretly. On a broader note, and for the purpose of this paper, corruption in its multifaceted dimensions and identification, which include supportive corruption, transactional corruption, extortion corruption, political corruption, defensive corruption, inventive corruption, nepotism corruption, autogenic corruption, traditional and modern corruption, local, national and international corruption, representational, petty and grand corruption (Oladele 2013: 26; see also Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), can be summarized under three broad categories. First is the moralist school, which argues that corruption must be viewed

through “a good or bad prism”. The second is the structural-functionalist school, which holds that rather than view corruption as good or bad, it should be understood and engaged in terms of the role it plays in the functioning of the system (see Leff, 1964, Nye 1967 and *Times International* 1978). For instance, does it grease the wheels or does it impede the wheels of development in a society, like Leff (1964) and Nye (1967) observed? Is it, for instance, in the case of Nigeria, “the cement that cements the country together”, as *Times International* (1978) described it? The third is the radical school, which is based on the works of Karl Marx and several adaptations of these. The postulation is that corruption is simply “a feature of capitalism which in itself dictates (unhealthy) competition that eventually breeds fraud, waste and abuse” (Yagboyaju, 2014: 23).

Driving this conceptualization further, the position of Heidenheimer, Johnston and Le Vine (1989) should be useful. In this work, the authors identified three definitions of corruption. These are namely: the public centred, which views corruption as an act of misuse of public office for personal gains; the market-centred, which situates the acts of corruption in terms of its being an extra-legal act used by individuals or groups to influence actions of public bureaucracies; and the public interest-centred, which views corruption mainly as a destroyer of public interest in which case the very act of corruption negatively impacts public interest.

By and large, these conceptualizations sufficiently indicate that corruption is antithetical to good governance and sustainable development in so many ways. This, for instance, transcends the general opinion about the squandering of scarce resources that are supposed to be invested for development, to the more fundamental problem of eroding the confidence of the generality of the citizens in a corrupt government and, possibly, their country as a whole. Nigeria and China, in some fundamental ways, exemplify this. While almost all aspects of life, as analysed in a subsequent section of the paper, suffer from the worsening effects of uncontrolled corruption and the growing culture of impunity in the former, the latter that has stiff penalties for acts of corruption, at the same time, appears not to understand how a one-party system can worsen the same problem of corruption.

Although democracy, just like the first term conceptualized in this paper, does not enjoy a clear-cut or ultimate definition, it is broadly

regarded as a people-oriented form of government. Similarly, although direct democracy, in which there is the popular participation in day-to-day governance, was regarded the ideal at the beginning in the ancient Greek *polis*, liberal democracy or representative democracy has, over time, emerged as the dominant model. In the light of this, Held (1993:16) enumerated the major elements of a democratic system. According to him, liberal democracy in its contemporary form includes “a cluster of rules and institutions permitting the broader participation of the majority of citizens in the selection of representatives who alone can make political decisions”. In more specific terms:

This cluster includes elected government; free and fair elections in which every citizen’s vote has equal weight; a suffrage which embraces all citizens irrespective of distinctions of race, religion, class, sex and so on; freedom of conscience, information and expression on all public matters broadly defined; the right of all adults to oppose their government and stand for office; and associational autonomy – the right to form independent associations including social movements, interest groups and political parties. (Held, 1993:16)

Environmental peculiarities which differentiate political systems and societies across the globe notwithstanding, it is deductive from the above explanations that democracy consists of a set of ideals, institutions and processes of governance that allows the broad mass of people to have freedom of association and choice, particularly in terms of group affiliation and candidates, representatives or leaders for and or in public positions.

However, this conception of democracy, which emphasizes formal political rights and processes to the somewhat exclusion of economic concerns, can be criticized for “being narrow” (see Enemuo 1999: 145). Driven further, Ake (1993: A9), argues that in most liberal democracies “poverty often prevents the mass of the people from actualizing and enjoying their political and civic rights while the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few gives the economically privileged minority preponderant political influence”. The recognition of such paradox has led to calls for the broadening of the notion of democracy to incorporate social and economic upliftment of the masses. This, in a way, explains the dominant participation

of the state in the process of economic development of its society as it has over the years prevailed in China and Korea among other examples of centralized economic systems (see Rose-Ackerman 1978; Wade 1985; Nnoli 1986; Kang 2002).

The party system is an integral part of democracy which should also be analysed here. This is essential, because, whether as in China and other prominent one-party states or in the USA, UK and Germany, among other multiparty political systems, the party system often impacts on the size and types of corruption in a society. Despite China's highest average growth rate of 11.42 per cent, annually between 1990 and 1995, the country was in 1996 ranked the fifth most corrupt out of 54 countries by Transparency International – T1 (see Wedeman, 1997). Similarly, in spite of the country's phenomenal economic growth, which is acknowledged across the globe, it is still enmeshed in serious allegations of corruption, way into the twenty-first century. The Thomas Reuters Trust Principles, in an online report accessed on May 31, 2017, for instance, reported that the number of corruption cases heard by Chinese courts jumped by about one-third in 2016. Almost all of these cases had a link to China's ruling Communist Party.

On the other hand, Nigeria's brand of multi-partyism is, unlike in Canada, the USA, UK and Germany, among other developed multiparty systems, yet to make significant impact in terms of reducing the endemic nature of corruption as well as generally improved living conditions in the country (Simbine and Yagboyaju, 2015). Other salient characteristics of the party system are well documented in scholarly works such as La Palombara and Weiner (1966) and Agbaje (1999) among others. In particular, this includes the "broad network of relationships through which parties interact and influence the political process" (Yakub, 2002: 120-121).

It is also important to conceptualize the term – development, and explain its application for the purpose of this paper. To start with, in many examples of the classics by Parsons (1951), Durkheim (1959) and Weber (1978) among several others, emphasis is placed on the socio-cultural, economic and political dimensions of the concept of development. The main point in almost all of these works, according to Onuoha (2007), has to do with the fact that the value system "is central to the changes and fundamental transformation", which are at the core of development. Thus,

development is essentially about change in the norms, beliefs, attributes and habits among other key factors that define the value system in a particular society (see Yagboyaju, 2014).

In this sense, development, according to Nnoli (1981: 14), is described as:

The process of actualizing man's inherent capacity to live a better and more rewarding life. It implies increased skill and capacity to do things; greater freedom, self-confidence, creativity, self discipline, responsibility and material well-being.

Quite often, development is viewed from the narrow perspective of economic growth, and this requires a bit of clarification. While both are interrelated and sometimes wrongly interchangeably applied, it should be noted that growth may take long to lead to development. Growth emphasizes numbers, which most often include "tangible, quantitative, macro economic development in terms of economic indices such as increase in income per capita, increase in output and GDP, increase in external reserves, increased trade revenue, and balance of payments surplus" (Oluwa 2012: 16). On the other hand, going by the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), for instance, development emphasizes qualitative improvement in the living conditions of the citizenry. It focuses, in particular, on the accessibility by ordinary citizens to the basic necessities and good things of life such as food, drinkable water, clothing, shelter, health care, public sanitation, education and job opportunities among others.

It is in this light that the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, for instance, set the following eight development goals:

- i. eradication of extreme poverty and hunger;
- ii. universal primary education;
- iii. promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women;
- iv. reduction of child mortality;
- v. improvement of maternal health;
- vi. combating of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other (endemic) diseases;
- vii. ensuring environmental sustainability; and

viii. designing of a global partnership for development (UN 2000).

A timeline of 15 years was set for the attainment of these goals, just as 18 quantifiable targets, which are measured by 48 indicators, were also set. One of these key indicators is the consolidation of electoral democracy. Thus, as advanced, for instance, by Olopoenia (1998), Roberts (1999), Simbine (2000), Simbine and Oladeji (2010), and Simbine and Yagboyaju (2015) among others, while economic growth is a fundamental component of development, the contemporary understanding of the latter also emphasizes some key attributes that are not essentially economic in nature. These include the need for political goals, participation in public affairs and the means for achieving them, which include political parties, a generally liberalized political landscape and, of course, sustainable economic opportunities.

Obviously, the paradox of growth without development is a key determinant in the low rankings of China and Nigeria in the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), for instance. While smaller economies such as the Netherlands, Sweden, France and Norway, among several others with relatively higher evidences of socio-economic and political liberalization, have long before the advent of the twenty-first century and even almost two decades into the century been constantly named as the world's best governed and developed countries, China is not (see Rodee et al., 1983). The same applies to Nigeria, which despite its tremendous economic breakthroughs under the Yakubu Gowon military regime (1966-1975) and even during the civilian dispensation between 1999 and 2007 is yet to be ranked high in UN's HDI. Nigeria, even with an eighteen-year old (1999-2017) multipartyism in operation, has insignificant records for credible elections, respect for human rights and dignity, independent judiciary and such other elements, which make the world's developed areas tick (see Yagboyaju 2016).

### **Nature of Socio-Political and Economic Life in Nigeria and China**

What is the character or nature of the dominant processes in Nigeria's as well as China's socio-political and economic life? How are these processes affected or influenced by the character of the modern state in Nigeria and China? In addressing these two questions, I endeavoured to draw from explanations on experiences around the globe, particularly in respect of the general notion on the connection between the evolution or



formation of a state, its character and processes through which socio-political groups and institutions as well as other important aspects of the life of the citizens are coordinated and moderated.

In the Nigerian case, three broad state forms have evolved namely: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. In pre-colonial Nigeria, traditional political systems in the different parts were relatively weak and unstable, while the colonial state essentially pursued the interests of the colonial lords and their indigenous collaborators at the expense of the generality of the ordinary citizens. Different aspects of the operations of the colonial state, including those on the impact of the state on political formation, are relatively well documented. A common line of explanation in most of the prominent studies, including for instance those by Ekeh (1975), Nnoli (1978), Ake (1981), Sklar (1983), and Ayoade (2010), is that the artificial beginning of Nigeria by way of the 1914 amalgamation of diverse ethnic nationalities is at the core of most of the multi-dimensional challenges, with far-reaching consequences that had confronted the country over the years.

In view of its somewhat forceful emergence, the colonial state lacked the required legitimating ideals. Therefore, it essentially relied on the use of force as well as its autocratic and dictatorial character, all of which made it more or less an example of “administocracy” (see Simbine and Yagboyaju, 2015) – a system that emphasized forceful compliance with law, order, and regulation. It was under this hostile condition that nationalist activities and, in particular, the formation of political parties commenced.

Given this background, especially one in which the colonially-contrived modern state was seen and treated as an alien structure whose offices should, at best, be exploited and manipulated for the attainment of some vested and sectional interests, it did not take time before the Nigeria Youth Movement (NYM), Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), and National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the forerunner political associations and parties, with supposed national agenda, began to exhibit evidences of parochialism and tribalism. All of these, coupled with mutual suspicion among the key political actors, worsened over time.

This largely accounted for the subsequent formation of regional parties like the Action Group (AG) and the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in the then Western and Northern regions respectively. Several other smaller parties emerged either as splinter groups or for the purposes of

other sectional or minority interests. It should be noted that these formations along ethnic and such other sectional lines negated some broad views on the functions of political parties, especially in respect of educating, articulating and aggregating issues that are supposed to reduce the “salience and potency of ethnic chauvinism, bigotry, and other manifestations of communal and cultural intolerance” (Yakub 2002: 122), among others that the parties felt the public was not well informed about or about which they wanted to make their own positions clear.

Thus, despite the general opinion on the relatively high level of infrastructural and human capacity development in Nigeria’s regions at that point in time, a major impediment was the politicization of ethnicity, coupled with a somewhat leadership deficiency in respect of not being able to tolerate and accommodate so as to enhance the required foundation for nation building and other quantitative as well as qualitative changes that combined to define sustainable development. This and other similar factors of abuse and corruption were emphasized by the military when it struck to terminate the life of the country’s First Republic in January 1966.

Civil rule was not reintroduced until thirteen years later, in October 1979. Meanwhile, it should be noted that although the Second Republic commenced in 1979, its making, which included the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution, formation of political parties and the conduct of the first set of elections, coincided with negative tendencies that were essentially “prebendal and clientelistic” (Joseph, 1991). Although the genesis of these disturbing elements and its equally debilitating features such as nepotism, cronyism and primitive accumulation of material wealth through the manipulation of official privileges could be traced to the immediate post-independence era and, by extension, the First Republic, the practices worsened under the country’s first stretch of military rule.

Thus, the five political parties – Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP) and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), which participated in the first set of electoral exercises, contended with the effects of ethnic problems and the politicization of ethnicity as well as other serious socio-economic issues that only a directional and purposive leadership could resolve. Obviously, it was in the light of this fundamental requirement for nation building that the military regime insisted that the new parties, apart

from reflecting Nigeria's principle of federal character in the distribution of their key offices, must also have offices (signifying their existence and presence) in two-thirds of the then nineteen states of the federation.

Quite importantly, these five political parties and the sixth-Nigeria Advance Party (NAP), which was later registered for the second round of elections in 1983, relatively met the conditions set by the military regime, in collaboration with the then Electoral Commission. However, with the possible exception of GNPP and NAP, almost all the other parties had a preponderance of political stalwarts and leaders who played active roles in the activities of the defunct First Republic's political parties. Nonetheless, the NPN, which controlled the central government as well as the majority of the seats in both the Senate and House of Representatives, and fifty per cent of the then nineteen state governments, had a more impressive spread than the others. Thus, in terms of its presence and electoral successes in the core North, North East, North Central (Middle Belt), parts of the South-South and parts of the South-East; consisting of five out of today's six geopolitical zones in Nigeria, the NPN could be described as the first truly national party in the country.

Despite this and other relatively significant democratic achievements, the ruling party (NPN) and the entire Second Republic fell on the last day of 1983 as a result of a military coup, for which corruption and general economic mismanagement, among others, were given as major reasons. However, the Second Republic exemplified certain characteristics which, in spite of the inadequacies that led to its fall, are quite useful to this analysis of the party system in contemporary Nigeria. First, the generality of the political parties in that dispensation exhibited a relatively high level of discipline and respect for their own rules, all of which accounted for internal democracy, especially in respect of the selection of candidates and standard bearers. Secondly, although there were prominent party and campaign financiers, it was not a common practice for such financiers to become as powerful as to hijack the parties, neither was it so common for aggrieved members, during or after the conduct of party primaries, to defect to other parties nor drag their parties to law courts for redress. This, in a way, implied that the internal mechanisms for conflict management within the political parties were so strong and effective that they discouraged frivolities and other acts of unnecessary heating up of the polity.

Also, despite the negative tendencies and the trappings of restrictive and exclusive patronage, especially in favour of party stalwarts and other categories of supporters as well as admirers, Nigeria's party system and politics at that time still exemplified a "solidaristic" (in which a larger section, even if party stalwarts and supporters, benefitted), pattern of clientele and prebendal networks, in which a relatively broad section of the society could access material benefits. This pattern changed completely, especially from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s; a period which coincided with the second coming of the military into national politics.

A prominent feature of this period that I should point out was the rapid change from the "solidaristic" character of the country's prebendal and clientele politics to a more "egoistic" system of public affairs (see Yagboyaju, 2004; Simbine and Yagboyaju, 2015). In other words, the enduring character of public policy processes, which largely consisted of poor planning and implementation, inefficiency, lack of continuity, avoidable failures, nepotism, corruption, social dislocation, poverty and evident weakening of political processes and institutions, among others, rapidly took the form of "egoism". Under this system, the ruler, as exemplified by Generals I.B. Babangida and Sani Abacha (1985-1993 and 1993-1998 respectively), became more autocratic and more conscious of himself, his immediate family, friends and associates. Incidentally, this period coincided with another round of phenomenal increase in Nigeria's earnings from the sale of crude oil, which not only boosted the country's revenue but also enhanced opportunities for illicit wealth accumulation for looters in sensitive government positions.

Meanwhile, in view of the country's prebendal and clientele politics that I have cited in preceding sections of this paper, it was no coincidence that this period of higher level of personal rule and another round of "oil boom" in Nigeria gave birth to a new breed of super rich Nigerians, who had different links with the successive regimes between the mid-1980s and the commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1999. However, it should be noted that there was the short-lived Third Republic, in-between. For the purpose of this paper, the most distinguishing features of that particular dispensation where a military president was in charge at the centre, at the same time having civilian governors at the state level, included the establishment of two political parties – the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC) by the government and not the

people, as well as the cancellation of the June 12, 1993 presidential election results.

The reintroduction of civil rule and the commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1999 coincided with the growing prominence and, perhaps, notoriety of the new breed of the super rich political class in Nigeria. Not surprisingly, the group played very active roles in the entire process of the formation of many of the prominent political parties and the selection or placement of candidates for strategic public offices among several others.

Quite disturbingly, Nigeria's new breed of the super rich and the remaining traditional elites who had, all along in the successive military regimes between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s as well as in the first sixteen years of the Fourth Republic and probably for some time to come, determined the country's socio-political and economic directions, have for this long shown little or no regard for such apparently belittling doctrine as "equality of all citizens before the law" (see Iwu, 2008). This explains the rising culture of impunity and lack of order within political parties and in Nigeria's democratic process as well as in individual tendencies across almost all facets of life. More than eighteen years after the 1999 commencement of the current democratic attempt, it is, therefore, not surprising that most political parties not only lack internal democracy, but also distinct implementation of development agenda.

Curiously, while Nigeria's long encounter with military rule is often fingered for arbitrariness and the inability to lay a solid foundation for development, several leaders with military backgrounds and many strongmen regimes across the world enabled solid developmental take-offs for their countries at different points in time. Examples of the latter include Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler, Abdel Nasser, Lee Kwan Yew and Mao Tse Tung.

Before the analysis of specific aspects from which Nigeria and China would draw lessons, it is appropriate to examine the nature of China's socio-political and economic life, just as has been done in the case of Nigeria in the preceding paragraphs. To start with, according to a 2013 report by Lawrence and Martin (2013: 1), China is the "world's second largest economic power, one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the only Communist Party-led state in the G-20 grouping of major economies". As the world's most populous country, with 1.381 billion

people (2016 Year Book) and a vibrant productive base, China is a global force to reckon with.

The China Communist Party (CCP or The Party), which came to power in 1949 by means of a civil war victory over the forces of Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalists, has a clear record of longevity that is, so far, surpassed only by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that was established in 1922 and collapsed in 1991. The current regime is named People's Republic of China (PRC). China's highest decision-making bodies consist of the Communist Party's seven-man Politburo Standing Committee and the 25-member Politburo.

True to the Leninist beginnings and connections of the CCP, it dominates state and society in China. Its power, according to Fisher (2010: 5), rests on four pillars:

Its control of China's approximately 2.25 million person-strong military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), its 1.5 million person-strong paramilitary force, the People's Armed Police, and its 800,000 other internal security forces; its control of personnel appointments across all political institutions, the military, state-owned corporations, and public institutions; its control of the media; its control of the judiciary and the internal security apparatus.

In addition, in accordance with China's 1982 state constitution, adopted six years after the death of Mao Tse Tung, the country's unicameral legislature - the National People's Congress, is described as the "highest organ of state power". The constitution gives the NPC the power to:

Amend the constitution; supervise its enforcement; enact and amend laws; ratify and abrogate treaties; approve the state budget and plans for national economic and social development; elect and impeach top officials of the state and judiciary; and supervise the work of the State Council, the State Central Military Commission, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate. (see Lawrence and Martin, 2013: 7)

It should be noted that China's political institutions and political culture have evolved significantly over the years, with the "CCP's willingness to adapt helping to explain why it has, so far at least, avoided the fate of its sister parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe" (Lawrence and Martin, 2013: 1). Also, other political actors have increasingly influenced debates. Prominent among such actors who have joined forces to advance particular causes include an increasingly diverse media, micro-bloggers, state-owned and private corporations, official and quasi-official research institutes, university academics, officially-sponsored associations and societies, and grassroots non-governmental organizations (see Lawrence and Martin, 2013: 2).

However, the National People's Congress (NPC) and almost all the other institutions listed above have over the years been unable to have significant impact as their counterparts in more democratic and liberalized systems do in places like USA, Canada, Australia and several parts of Western Europe. One major reason for the NPC's weakness, in more practical terms as against its paper strength, for example, is the Communist Party's insistence that the NPC should serve the purpose of a rubber stamp for party decisions. It should, for instance, be noted that although the constitution gives the NPC the right to "elect" such top state officials as the President, Vice President, and Chairman of the State Central Military Commission, in practical terms, the Party decides who fills those positions, after which the NPC ratifies such decisions. And, going by its antecedents, it is unlikely that the NPC will refuse to ratify the party's decisions (for more explanations, see Jinsong, 2003: 86-104).

China's socio-political ideology and cultural elements, as described above, obviously indicate a kind of "regulated liberalism" or "democratic totalitarianism". This, unlike in places such as the USA, Canada, Australia and Germany, among several other systems which emphasize effective separation of powers, is a form of restriction on China's potentialities. In particular, these include the many developmental goals that are more attainable with democratic principles and ethos such as transparency, accountability and general openness.

Thus, with the obviously higher level of permissiveness in Nigeria's multipartyism and broad patron-client networks and China's peculiarly closed system, in which the CCP remains the dominant factor, the specific

lessons being drawn for the two countries centre on the abuse of privileges by their ruling parties.

### **Selected Cases of Corruption and Official Misconduct**

Obviously, Nigeria and China operate distinctively different party systems and political processes. While Nigeria operates a multi-party system with its peculiarities, China's preference is the one-party system that is also typified by its unique features. However, there are aspects of the two systems that can be deployed for a comparative exercise. In line with Nigeria's brand of multipartyism and the fierce nature of the competition among and between the political parties, essentially because of ethno-religious and class factors as well as the growing culture of money politics, the focus will be on the impact of campaign funding and elections finance both from within and outside government circles. For China, where competition for party and government positions is not as intense as in Nigeria's multi-party system, the emphasis is on the activities of local government officials as well as business and state-owned enterprises. Here, the absence of any formidable opposition, in terms of alternative parties, creates huge opportunities for abuse.

Many studies, including Onuoha (2002), Adetula (2008) and Jian-Ming (2000), have documented the deleterious effects of the factors cited above on both the party systems and political processes in Nigeria and China. To start with, an important aspect of the funding of campaigns and financing of elections in contemporary Nigeria is the fierce nature of electoral competitions that is partly caused by the unrestrained conduct of the political gladiators, but more importantly, by the incapacity of the state to ensure full implementation of its own laws. Drawing from this, it came as no big surprise that retired army generals first dominated the list of the Peoples Democratic Party's (PDP's) most powerful financiers at the commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1999. At that time, and up to May 2015 when the PDP lost the presidential and many other important elections, particularly the National Legislature, the party was the most attractive. Therefore, apart from the 1999 exercise, in which Generals T.Y. Danjuma, Ali Mohammed Gusau, Mohammadu Wushishi and I.B. Babangida played very prominent roles, subsequent electoral exercises were also characterized by the activities of financiers in the PDP as well as the few other prominent political parties.



In line with the typology of political money developed by Pareto (1934), in which the three basic motives for providing funds include: idealistic or ideological; social-aiming at social honours or access; and financial-striving for material benefits, it can be argued that the third dominates in present day Nigeria. Political parties and their candidates often engage in desperate fund-raising. Incidentally, this has grown so tremendously over the years. Although, as in the case cited in a preceding section of the paper, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in 1999 was the most dominant in this practice during its sixteen years (1999-2015) of governmental control at the centre and in most of the states across the country, some other political parties were also involved at different points in time.

At such fund-raising ceremonies, politicians and businessmen, corporate business interests including construction companies and 'friends' who are often unnamed make generous donations. There were also "valuable donations in kind while incumbent political office holders readily deployed state resources to personal and partisan electoral advantage" (Roberts, 2010: 711). The result was excess liquidity in the polity and the excessive monetization of the electoral and political processes not only fuelled desperation and extremism, but also implied that aspirants without such financial strength were, irrespective of integrity or competence, not considered. It was also inconceivable to lose and, therefore, having invested so much, candidates and their supporters were prepared to indulge in malpractices and irregularities. This is how Nigerian electoral politics, by 2007, became a *do-or-die*, life and death process in which target constituencies must be *captured* by any means necessary. Shocking memories of the 2007 and 2011 electoral debacles were rekindled by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), in its report that was released in August 2016 (*The Punch*, 2016: 20).

Political fund-raising and its corruptive tendencies were taken to another level in 2014 when the PDP, under President Jonathan and 21 state governors, raised a whopping sum of "₦21.27 billion in support of the party's campaigns" in the 2015 general elections (*The Punch*, 2014: 1 & 26). Being a more recent example than the others cited earlier, this particular exercise can be used to draw some relevant hints. First is the list of donors. Leading the pack, one "Tunde Ayeni gave ₦2 billion on behalf of himself and his unnamed *partner* and *friends*; Jerry Gana, a permanent fixture in any

government in power since the late 1980s when he emerged Chairman of MAMSER, the Babangida military regime's mass mobilization agency, announced ₦5 billion on behalf of his equally mysterious *friends* and *associates* in the power sector". Not to be outdone, oil and gas "*friends*" also "pledged ₦5 billion; real estate and building sector, ₦1 billion; food and agriculture, ₦500 million; power, ₦500 million; construction, ₦310 million; road construction, ₦250 million; National Automotive Association, ₦450 million; and Shelter Development Limited, ₦250 million" (*The Punch* 2014: 1 & 26).

Secondly, these donations should raise some questions verging on transparency. In accordance with the 2006 Electoral Act and the amended Act of 2010, it is, for instance, necessary to ask about the list of the 5,000 donors behind Gana's ₦5 billion going by the section of the Electoral Act, which caps an individual donation at ₦1 million. It is also relevant to ask the Board of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), credited with a donation of ₦15 million, where it derived powers to donate to a political party? Having donated to PDP, it is also apt to ask whether the Commission will make similar donations to other parties since its budgets come from the national purse. As for others, especially the sectoral donors among which are the quoted companies, did they get the approval of their shareholders before embarking on the spending spree? How did the power sector whose inability to raise investible funds, leading to calls to revoke the privatization deal so many years after its completion, come about a ₦500 million donation at this same fundraiser?

There are several violations that should be pointed out here. The PDP, like several other prominent parties in the Fourth Republic, violated Section 221 of the 1999 Constitution in its provision on the contribution to elections funds and finance, and Section 91 (2) of the Electoral Act of 2010, which specifies the maximum election expenses that an individual could incur. Similarly, in the particular case of the PDP fundraiser of 2014, Section 38 (2) of Nigeria's Companies and Allied Matters Act that expressly forbids companies from funding or donating gifts, property or money to political parties or associations was grossly violated.

It is obviously not only difficult to defend or justify almost all of these donations, but also should be noted that such toxic donations have the propensity to further poison Nigeria's electoral process and shore up the

system of patronage and corruption, among other obstacles to good governance and development. In fact, it is only in an environment of endemic corruption as largely represented by Nigeria's democratization from 1999 to 2015 that such flagrant violations, that impede development and the well-being of the generality of ordinary citizens, will likely go uninvestigated and, more importantly, unpunished, even if the culprits are uncovered. Incidentally, evidences from the investigation of the \$2.1 billion fake arms procurement by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), under the headship of Colonel Sambo Dasuki (rtd); the controversial handling of the protection of oil pipelines and such other installations to ex-militants by the Jonathan administration; the investigation of the activities of the National Maritime Administration and Security Agency (NIMASA); and the prosecution of Dr. Bukola Saraki, for false and anticipatory asset declaration, among several others, clearly show how endemic and deep rooted corruption has become in Nigeria.

Meanwhile, in view of China's closed and somewhat regimented party and political system, official corruption is also particularly severe in areas with significant state involvement (see Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2012). This can be corroborated by the report by Fung (2013), in which he said that business and organized crime engage in corrupt activities "with local government officials, the judiciary and the police". In a specific example of such collusion, Fung (2013) pointed at "recent corruption scandals that were uncovered", in connection with "current and former governments, CCP, security and state-owned enterprise officials", who "used forged and false identity and hukou documents, often with assistance from other state officials including police, to amass large property portfolios". Corruption is also reported in the military, although its effects appear to have less impact on the day-to-day activities of ordinary citizens.

However, the Stratfor report of 2008 is more directly relevant to this paper. It states for instance that local government officials and politicians often "rely on shadow governments of local powerbrokers, who are not necessarily tied to the CCP, and may be associated with organized crime to make ends meet". Several other reports support this. For example, a February 2013 report from the *Economist* Intelligence Unit stated that corruption is entrenched in the CCP as "elevation within the CCP requires, at the minimum, tacit acceptance of corruption practices, while a significant number of officials consider such activities essential to advancement".

A more disturbing aspect of all these practices, as reported by Business Anti-Corruption Portal (2012) and Minzner (2011), has to do with the disincentives for the ordinary Chinese to report corruption at the local government level. It is reported that whistle-blowing on corrupt local officials is done at considerable personal risk, “especially in rural China, where corruption often involves powerful, far-reaching local officials who also control the channels for reporting injustices”. Indeed, Mizner (2011) and Freedom House reported that there are poor whistle-blower protections in China and that local authorities often “retaliate against individuals who raise the curtain on corrupt dealings, leading some whistle-blowers to flee their hometowns and move overseas or to Beijing”.

In a similar vein, China’s peculiar party and political systems have clear indicators of the adverse effects of fraud, bribery and kickbacks, all of which arise from the heavy regulations by the government in nearly all types and levels of industry in the country. This comprises the mining sector, the construction sector, land matters, banking, commerce and finance among several others. Apparently, this partly accounted for the 2012/2013 report by the World Economic Forum’s *Global Competitiveness Document* in which corruption was ranked as a prominent problematic factor against doing business in China. To buttress this, a news article in a March 2012 edition of the state-owned *Xinhua* reported that the people’s procuratorates (an important legal supervision organ of China) investigated “over 10,000 cases of commercial bribery in 2011, involving assets worth USD 530 million”. Although the report did not say the number of prosecutions made out of the investigations as well as the number of offenders who were punished, it stated that most of the cases “were related to the engineering, construction and real estate sectors” (*Xinhua*, 2012).

All of these were also confirmed by the United States Department of State (USDOS) in its 2011 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, in which it stated that in 2011 “there were numerous cases in China where public officials and leaders of high profile state-owned enterprises were investigated for corruption, including several very senior executives who were found guilty of embezzling funds and accepting bribes”. The report emphasized that many of these cases of corruption involved “areas that were heavily regulated by the government” and therefore highly susceptible to various forms of abuse from the officials in charge.

Incidentally, China's *Civil Servant Law of the PRC* 2006 is supposed to provide safety valves against conflict of interests. It is observed, however, that very little has been achieved in this respect because of the weakness of the enforcement instrumentality. In addition, "there is no legal mechanism to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials" (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2013).

Thus, in all of these, what are the lessons for Nigeria and China, particular in terms of democratic consolidation, sustainable development and the control of corruption? To start with, Nigeria, unlike China, is not a country to be classified as a repressive state. Nigeria's democracy, nowhere near perfect, generally grants freedom to the generality of the citizens to express their feelings toward the government. According to Ogunlesi (2015: 35), "no internet site is banned here, and there is no danger of the government pulling the plug on the Internet". There has always been "a plurality of opinion in our media, intensified in recent years by social media" (Ogunlesi, 2015: 35).

Although there have been instances of censorship and muzzling of the Press, especially under President Obasanjo and at some point when the newly sworn-in President Muhammadu Buhari specifically chastised a section of the media (see Mimiko, 2015: 27), there are several things that a journalist or critic would get away with in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, which would earn him a lengthy jail term in "democratic" China. In addition, democratization in Nigeria has always permitted the existence of opposition parties, no matter that they are often weak. Incidentally, it was this kind of permission that ensured a most un-African feat of an opposition coalition dethroning an entrenched ruling party (PDP) in Nigeria's March/April 2015 general elections.

But China is a country where things, in terms of visible physical infrastructure and other important aspects of economic growth, get done efficiently. This is probably why, for example, Chinese construction companies were invited to help in revamping Nigeria's railway system constructed during colonial rule. Apart from the Lagos-Kano line opened in 1912, which went into decline in the 1970s and finally stopped working in 2002, the revamping of which Chinese companies are involved, the latter are also involved in different ways in the Abuja (Nigeria's seat of government)

intracity light rail and the Abuja–Kaduna “standard gauge” railway (see Ogunlesi, 2015: 35).

However, while the cross-country colonial railway system that is supposedly being revamped is yet to be completed, the Abuja–Kaduna “standard gauge” that commenced in 2011 was commissioned in July 2016. Meanwhile, the power sector is another example of Nigeria’s perennial web of scandals and controversies. The Mambilla Dam project was, for example, conceived during President Obasanjo’s second term in office (2003–2007) and was touted as Nigeria’s equivalent of China’s Three Gorges project. Ten years after, in addition to the “tens of billions of dollars in state funds that have gone into the power sector since the 1999 commencement of the Fourth Republic” (Ogunlesi, 2015: 35), President Jonathan, in 2015, handed over a power generation profile that was hardly better than Obasanjo inherited from the military in 1999. Meanwhile, in this same period, China added several tens of thousands of megawatts of electricity to its existing capacity.

Also, in comparative terms, the power project of Ethiopia, a repressive state in Africa, should be another reference point. The country is currently building a dam that when finished in 2017, as scheduled, will be the largest so far in Africa. At an “estimated cost of about \$4.7 billion” (Ogunlesi, 2015: 35), Ethiopia, even as a landlocked country with no natural resources that are comparable to Nigeria’s vast endowments, will more than likely attain what the latter could not achieve even after spending far higher sums of money. In effect, Ethiopia exemplifies how some aspects of the Chinese socio-political and economic system work efficiently even in Africa.

The fight against corruption is another point that should be useful here. While in the case of China, the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) and the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) have been reported for their brilliant performances (see Jian-Ming 2000: 194), Nigeria’s ICPC and EFCC, both of which are largely supposed to be adaptations from the Chinese example, are yet to make as much impact. The consequences of corruption are quite dire, or even draconian, for offenders in China. Although it is criticized, particularly in the USA and many parts of Western Europe, it is for instance common to punish offenders with the death penalty in the country. This was the case with Zhang Shuguang, deputy chief engineer of the now disbanded China railway ministry, who was found guilty of collecting bribes over a period of 11 years (see *Sunday Punch*

2015: 16). This and several other cases in China, like in Indonesia and many other countries with deleterious effects of corruption, will make the handling of serious cases of corruption in Nigeria and the type of punishment for offenders appear like a comedy. While Dr. Peter Odili, one time governor of Rivers State, has since the end of his tenure in 2007 secured a perpetual court injunction not to be prosecuted, several others in his category were either asked to return a fraction of their loot or awarded other forms of light punishment.

Similarly, the relatively recent adoption of plea bargaining, in which elite offenders in high profile corruption cases are freed in exchange for returning a fraction of their loot, was exemplified in the case of John Yusuf, a deputy director in the Federal Civil Service, who was convicted for his role in the ₦27billion pension scam, but got away with a paltry fine of ₦750,000 – less than 3.0 per cent of the total amount involved in the scam. Shoddy investigations and prosecution, which indicate incompetence or sabotage, have also made the country's battle against corruption largely ineffective.

In very clear terms, the Nigerian and Chinese examples, in respect of party systems and levels of corruption squarely fit into the aphorism, "the hood does not make the monk". While Nigeria's adoption of multipartyism has not enhanced the country's growth and development, as it is found in many other countries with multi-party systems, China has continued to record phenomenal economy growth and relative development even with its sticking to a one-party system that has over the years rapidly become less fashionable. Meanwhile, it should be noted that in line with the argument and classification by Stepan (1994), which Yagboyaju (2012: 116) adopted, there is a higher probability of development in the free and competitive systems of the advanced democracies of Western Europe and the United States of America as against the closed systems, which "strengthens absurdity and arbitrariness in parts of Mediterranean Europe, South America and Asia" (Yagboyaju 2004; 2012: 116).

It is therefore my view that although Nigeria missed the opportunity of building a solid foundation for growth and development under the country's few outstanding military and strongmen regimes, unlike what China, and even countries such as USA, Germany and a host of other contemporary advanced democratic systems did at different points in time, it is still very possible for Nigeria to develop under a transformational and

directional democratic leadership. And, for China, the examples of the USA, Germany and UK, among other contemporary advanced democracies that had experiences of strongmen regimes or leaders with military and autocratic backgrounds, could serve the purpose of an adaptable template for opening up after China's relatively long period of stability and functionality of its centralized and closed organs of government.

### **Conclusion**

Obviously, contemporary Nigeria is confronted by numerous problems and challenges that have made democratic governance and the attainment of development aspirations quite difficult. This is in spite of the country's supposed adoption of multipartyism, a system that has over the years enhanced both economic growth and sustainable development in several parts of the world. Incidentally, this includes even countries that are, in terms of natural and other material as well as human resources, less endowed than Nigeria.

On the other hand, China has, even with the one-party system that has over the years been widely criticized because of its failure and subsequent abandonment in many parts of the world, made significant impact in terms of economic and infrastructural growth as well as a relatively high level standard of living among its huge population. China, in view of these latter factors, is a global point of reference.

One remarkable difference between Nigeria and China, particularly in respect of the issues of corruption, democracy and development, has to do with the level of the functionality and autonomy of the modern state and, by extension, the efficiency and effectiveness of sensitive public institutions. In addition, the role of the leadership, followership and the generality of the civil society cannot be underestimated in all of these. More specifically, Nigeria can draw lessons from the impact which a higher level of public policy implementation has over the years had in China, while the latter also has a lot to gain from several multi-party systems with strong adherence to the rule of law and capacity for the strict implementation of regulations in general. It should be noted that Nigeria's poor and abysmal representation of multipartyism is largely based on the country's lack of capacity to enforce its important laws and regulations. Obviously, multipartyism has enhanced the attainment of development aspirations and goals in several parts of the



world such that it is so far generally regarded as the most preferable governance option.

## References

- Adetula, V (Ed.). (2008). *Money and Politics in Nigeria*, Abuja: International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES).
- Agbaje, A. (1999). Political parties and pressure groups. In: R. Anifowose and F. Enemuo (Eds.) *Elements of Politics*. Lagos: Sam Iroanusi Publications.
- Ake, C. (1981). *A Political Economy of Africa*. London: Longman.
- Ake, C. 1993. Is Africa Democratizing? *The Guardian* (Lagos, Nigeria), December 12, p.A9.
- Ayoade, J.A.A. (2010). *Nigeria: Positive Pessimism and Negative Optimism*. Valedictory lecture, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, September 17.
- Business Anti-Corruption Portal. (2012). *Snapshot of the China Profile, December* <<http://www.businessanti-corruption.com/en/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/china/snapshot/>>
- Durkheim, E. (1959). *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. (2013). *China Politics: The party is not yet over for corrupt officials*, February 12.
- Ekeh, P. (1975). Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17(1): 91-112.
- Enemuo, F. (1999). Democracy, human rights and rule of law. In: R. Anifowose and F. Enemuo (Eds.) *Elements of Politics...* op. cit.
- Fisher, R.D. (2010). *China's Military Modernization: Building for regional and global reach*. Stanford University Press.
- Fung, E. (2013). China hit by scandals over officials' property. *The Wall Street Journal*, USA, February 6.
- Heidenheimer, A.J., M. Johnston, and T. Le Vine (Eds.) (1989). *Political Corruption: A handbook*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Held, D. (Ed.) (1993). *Prospects for Democracy; North, South, East, West*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Iwu, M. (2008). The April 2007 Elections in Nigeria: What went right? – Public Lecture, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, April 15, p.10.

- Jian-Ming, D. (2000). Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China: A Brief Report. In: I. Lame and F. Odekunle (Eds.) *Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime in Nigeria: Challenges for the new millennium*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
- Jinsong, J. (2003). *The National People's Congress of China*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
- Joseph, R. (1991). *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the Second Republic*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
- Kang, D.C. (2002). Bad loans to good friends: money politics and the developmental state in South Korea. *International Organization* 56(1): 177-207.
- La Palombara, J. and M. Weiner. (1966). The origin and development of political parties. In: J. La Palombara and M. Weiner (Eds.) *Political Parties and Development*. Princeton University Press.
- Lawrence, S.V. and Martin, M.F. (2013). *Understanding China's Political System*. China: Congressional Research Service <www.crs.gov>
- Leff, N.H. (1964). Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption. *American Behavioral Scientist* 8: 8-14.
- Lewis, P.M. (2006). The Comparative Importance of Third Elections in Developing New Democracies. Distinguished Guest Lecture Series, No. 10, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lagos, Nigeria, August 22.
- Mimiko, O. (2015). Of Inauguration Speech and ominous signs. *The Punch* (Lagos, Nigeria), June 9, p.27.
- Minzner, C. (2011). *Countries at Crossroads 2011-China*. Freedom House, November 10.
- Nnoli, O. (1978). *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers.
- Nnoli, O. (1981). *Path to Nigerian Development*. Senegal: CODESRIA Book Series.
- Nnoli, O. (1986). *Introduction to Politics*. Lagos: Longman.
- Nye, J.S. (1967). Corruption and political development: A cost benefit analysis. *American Political Science Review* 61: 417-427.
- Ogunlesi, T. (2015). Nigeria's brand of repression. *The Punch* (Lagos, Nigeria), May 18, p.35.
- Oladele, K. (2013). Corruption and national security: Role of the media. *The Punch* (Lagos, Nigeria), May 13, p. 26.

- Olopoenia, R. (1998). A Political Economy of Corruption and Underdevelopment, Faculty of the Social Sciences Lecture Series, No. 10, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, October 7.
- Oluwa, K. (2012). Paradox of growth without development. *The Punch* (Lagos, Nigeria), March 13, p.16.
- Onuoha, B. (2002). Transition, democracy and the debate on the funding of political parties in Nigeria. In: B. Onuoha and M. M. Fadakinte (Eds.) *Transition Politics in Nigeria, 1970-1999*. Lagos: Malthouse Press.
- Onuoha, B. (2007). Policy reforms in Nigeria: Contradictions and challenges for implementation. In: R. Anifowose and T. Babawale (Eds.) *Nigeria Beyond 2007: Issues, challenges and prospects*. Lagos: Concept Publications.
- Pareto, V. (1934). *The Mind and Society*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Parsons, T. (1951). *The Social System*. Glencoe: The Free Press.
- Roberts, N. (1999). The problem of political development in Nigeria. In: *Political Development in Nigeria: Analysis of indicators*. NISER Annual Monitoring Research. Ibadan: NISER.
- Roberts, F.O.N. (2010). Issues in the evolution of Nigerian elections. In: S.O. Akande and A.J. Kumuyi (Eds.). *Nigeria at 50 – Accomplishments, challenges and prospects*. Ibadan: NISER.
- Rodee, C.C., C.Q. Christol, T.J. Anderson and T.H. Greene. (1983). *Introduction to Political Science*. Tokyo: McGraw Hill.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). *Corruption: A study in political economy*. New York: Academic Press.
- Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny. (1993). Corruption. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108(3): 599-617.
- Simbine, A.T. (2000). Citizen's Disposition towards Governance and Democratic Rule, *NISER Monograph Series*, No. 11, Ibadan: NISER.
- Simbine, A.T. and A. Oladeji. (2010). Overview, Challenges and Prospects of Governance and Political Development. In: S.O. Akande and A.J. Kumuyi (Eds.) *Nigeria at 50 – Accomplishments, challenges and prospects*. Ibadan: NISER.
- Simbine, A.T. and D.A. Yagboyaju. (2015). Party System and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Nigeria. Paper presented at the Annual Africa Conference, "Development, Urban Space and Human Rights", University of Texas, Austin, USA, April 3-5.

- Sklar, R.L. (1983). *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an emergent African nation*. NOK Publishers.
- Stepan, A. (1994). Corruption in South America. In: Duc. V. Trang (Ed.) *Corruption and Democracy*. Budapest: Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy.
- Stratfor. (2008). Organized Crime in China, August 19 <<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/organized-crime-china>>.
- Sunday Punch*. (2015). "Akinyemi's recipe for taming corruption", May 24, p.16.
- The Punch*. (2014). "₦21.27billion raised at PDP's fund raiser", December 23, pp.1 and 26.
- The Punch*. (2016). "Revisiting cases of electoral fraud", (Lagos, Nigeria), August 29, p.20.
- Times International*. (1978). "Corruption - The cement welding the country together" (London, UK), November 13, p.2.
- United Nations. (2000). Millennium Summit Report, Copenhagen.
- US Department of State (USDOS). (2012). *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2011 China* <<http://www.state.gov/;/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?/dlid=186268>>.
- Wade, R. (1985). The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is not better at development. *World Development* 13(4): 467-497.
- Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wedeman, A. (1997). Looters, rent-scrapers and dividend collectors: Corruption and growth in Zaire, South Korea and the Philippines. *The Journal of Developing Area* 31(4): 457-478.
- World Economic Forum. (2012). *The Global Competitiveness Report 2012/2013*, September 5, p.138.
- Xinhua*. (2012). "Procuratorates investigate over 10,000 commercial bribery cases in 2011", China, March 20.
- Yagboyaju, D.A. (2004). *The State and Political Corruption in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis of the Shehu Shagari Administration (1979-1983) and the Ibrahim Babaginda Regime (1985-1993)*, Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Yagboyaju, D.A. (2012). *The State and Governance Crisis in Nigeria: Focus on two regimes*. Berlin, Germany: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing GmbH & Co.

- Yagboyaju, D.A. (2014). Nigeria and the political economy of underdevelopment: Focus on selected issues. *African Journal of Sustainable Development (AJSD)* 4(1): 17-44.
- Yagboyaju, D.A. (2014a). Leadership, followership and state dysfunctionality in contemporary Nigeria: An examination of consequences and possible solutions. *Journal of Governance and Public Policy* 4(2): 35-51. Institute of Public Enterprise, Hyderabad, India.
- Yagboyaju, D.A. (Ed.) (2016). *Reflections on Politics, Governance and the Economy in Contemporary Nigeria*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
- Yakub, N. (2002). Political Parties in the Transition Process. In: B. Onuoha and M.M. Fadakinte (Eds.) *Transition Politics in Nigeria, 1970-1999*. Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited.